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Introduction: Although NASA's preparations for 
the Apollo lunar missions had only a limited time to 
consider issues associated with the protection of the 
Moon from biological contamination and the quaran-
tine of the astronauts returning to Earth, they learned 
many valuable lessons (both positive and negative) in 
the process. As such, those efforts represent the base-
line of planetary protection preparations for sending 
humans to Mars. Neither the post-Apollo experience or 
the Shuttle and other follow-on missions of either the 
US or Russian human spaceflight programs could add 
many additional insights to that baseline. Current mis-
sion designers have had the intervening four decades 
for their consideration, and in that time there has been 
much learned about human-associated microbes, about 
Mars, and about humans in space that has helped pre-
pare us for a broad spectrum of considerations regard-
ing potential biological contamination in human Mars 
missions and how to control it. 
This paper will review the approaches used in get-
ting this far, and highlight some implications of this 
history for the future development of planetary protec-
tion provisions for human missions to Mars. The role 
of NASA and ESA 's planetary protection offices, and 
the aegis ofCOSPAR have been particularly important 
in this ongoing process. 
Shuttle Era Efforts: As the Space Shuttle was de-
veloped and eventually flown (1981), NASA was in-
terested in Shuttle-delivered modules as the basis of 
space activities, and for some those modules were best 
envisioned as a space station (then TBD). Of signifi-
cance to the development of planetary protection think-
ing in this era was the Antaeus Report [I], which iden-
tified speci fie needs for an orbiting space-station asso-
ciated module that might be dedicated to the quaran-
tine of a Mars sample. The report suggested the use of 
the smallest available bio1ogical test systems that could 
be emplaced by the Space Shuttle, then under devel-
opment. The human element was essential for making 
this concept feasible. 
Humans Exploring Space? : With a Presidential 
announcement of a Moon/Mars destination for NASA 
(1989), NASA's initial examination of the challenge 
[2] and other workshops [3] considered the issues of 
Mars exploration by humans and the planetary protec-
tion challenges associated with the then-current think-
ing about life on Mars. Sometimes the issues were 
well-considered, and sometimes less well conceived 
[4]. As it turned out there would be plenty of subse-
quent chances to continue to hone the effort to under-
stand the challenges and consequences associated with 
humans and their microbial "load" in an exploration 
setting. 
One of the first attempts to directly involve both 
human mission planners, developers, and medical per-
sonnel in the process of setting planetary protection 
requirements took place in Pingree Park, Colorado in 
June 2001 (5]. This workshop began a series of fo-
cused discussions among agency and mission-planner 
that continued in the first half of that decade. An im-
portant contribution a short willie after was the Safe on 
Mars report of the National Research Council [6], 
which considered all of the hazards associated with 
sending humans to Mars, including chemical and bio-
logical ones. A consensus effort came together in April 
2005 with a comprehensive workshop at the Lunar and 
Planetary Institute in Houston [7] that involved the life 
support and habitation personnel from the human space 
flight community. At that workshop the participants 
established three principles: 1) avoid forward contami-
nation of Mars or interference with scientific explora-
tion from terrestrially associated microbial contami-
nants; 2) protect astronauts from harmful contamina-
tion from martian life forms; and 3) control back con-
tamination from the spacecraft, astronauts and materi-
als that are returned to Earth. Finally to wrap up the 
workshops on planetary protection and humans, a joint 
NASA/ESA workshop was held at ESTEC in The 
Netherlands in May of 2005 [8]. That workshop in-
cluded splinter group discussions organized around 
three main areas with implications for planetary pro-
tection on human rated systems: 
• Advanced Life Support Systems (ALS); 
• Extravehicular Activities (EVA); and 
• Operations and Support (OPS). 
These splinter-group discussions considered operations 
and technology concerns, science activities and opera-
tions, backward contamination prevention require-
ments, and the protection of both the human habitat on 
Mars and the Earth upon crew return. They also identi-
fied future research and development needs for ALS, 
EVA, and Mars robotic missions, including specific 
precursor mission information necessary to understand 
and prepare for human support systems and science 
operations on long duration Mars missions. 
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COSPAR's lnterim Pr ovisions: The results of the 
various workshops and considerations regarding hu-
mans were largely consolidated by the NASAIESA 
workshop in 2005. Subsequently, those results were 
reported to COSPAR in Beijing in 2006, although no 
action was taken by the Panel on Planetary Protection 
at that time. The matter was presented and further dis-
cussed in 2008 at the COSPAR Assembly in Montreal 
[ 1 OJ, which resulted in a Panel on Planetary Protection 
resolution that went forward to the Bureau and 
COSPAR Council, and was approved by both groups. 
As a result, new section was added to the COSPAR 
Planetary Protectio11 Policy [11 ) that includes "Princi-
ples and Guidelines for Human Missions to Mars," 
with the following policy statement as a preamble: 
The intent of this planetary protection policy is 
the same whether a mission to Mars is conduct-
ed robotically or with human explorers. Ac-
cordingly, planetary protection goals should not 
be relaxed to accommodate a human mission to 
Mars. Rather, they become even more directly 
relevant to such missions-even if specific im-
plementation requirements must differ. 
Presently: The current planetary protection policy 
documents do not stipulate detai led requirements for 
future human missions to Mars,. but rather provide 
principles and guidelines of what will be needed for 
implementation of any successful mission and provide 
the basis to move forward to develop agency-level and 
eventually mission-level requirements. Appropriate 
agency-level documents are (will?) embodying the 
new requirements as they come forward. Such re-
quirements are essential complements to future human 
missions beyond Earth orbit, and can contribute to 
technology development and science activities on the 
Moon as well as to planning for human mission to 
Mars and use of its resources. As long as there is a 
possibility that Mars may have indigenous life, or that 
there are places on Mars where Earth organisms might 
survive and grow (cf., 12], planetary protection provi-
sions will be an essential part of activities and explora-
tion on Mars. 
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Introduction: As seen in previous human lunar 
and Mars surface robotic missions, Planetary Protec-
tion (PP) guidelines will serve as a strong driver in the 
design and operation of human exploration missions to 
Mars and other solar bodies. Likewise, science objec-
tives such as the search for evidence of past or present 
extraterrestrial life can also impact mission design. 
Therefore PP and science requirements for human mis-
sions need to be established well in advance of a mis-
sion to facilitate the timely and cost-effective design 
and execution of compliant spacecraft, habitation sys-
tems and surface operations. 
The PP requirements development process necessi-
tates a thorough knowledge of potential forward and 
back contaminants, contamination pathways and a cur-
rent understanding of the biological potential of the 
solar body. While numerous considerations are in-
volved in PP policy development, there are (at least) 
three key research and technology development pro-
grams that require close consideration and collabora-
tion. First is the human life support program, which is 
responsible for managing air, water and solid wastes, 
and providing food and thermal control. Secondly, the 
extravehicular activity (EVA) program is tasked with 
developing portable life support systems to enable 
human mobility, including suits and rovers. EVA ac-
tivities will generate forward and back contamination 
potential via human and equipment ingress/egress op-
erations and leakage. Finally, the monitoring and en-
vironmental control program is responsible for devel-
oping methods that facilitate the monitoring of con-
taminants relevant to established PP and scientific 
guidelines. Together, these three · areas will strongly 
interface with each other and will affect, and be affect-
ed by, PP considerations. 
Workshop Background and Objectives: Because 
of the lack of discrete PP regulations for proposed hu-
man Mars missions, members of these three communi-
ties concluded that establishing a dialogue that enabled 
PP requirements development was necessary. To this 
end, a workshop entitled the "Life Support & Habita-
tion and Planetary Protection Workshop" was con-
vened at the Center for Advanced Space Studies in 
Houston, TX on April 27-29, 200511J. Participants in-
cluded representatives from government, private in-
dustry and academia. A major objective of the work-
shop was to initiate communication, understanding, 
and a working relationship between the life support, 
monitoring and control, EVA and the PP communi-
ties regarding the effect of PP policy development and 
implementation requirements for future human mis-
sions. It was also intended to define top-level PP con-
cerns and issues associated with both forward and back 
contamination, and determine their likely effects on 
hardware development and operations for the first hu-
man mission to Mars. This included the identification 
of PP requirements that will be needed to guide future 
technology development in advance of the first human 
mission. The workshop was also designed to identify 
management approaches to reduce the risk of develop-
ing systems prior to full definition of PP policies, as 
well as critical research areas and gaps in science or 
technology capability. Participants were provided ini-
tial assumptions to provide defined boundaries during 
deliberations. 
Summary of OveraJI Workshop Findings: An array 
of findings and recommendations were generated dur-
ing the workshop. The top-level areas included the 
examination and identification of potential forward 
and backward contaminants and associated release 
pathways. Mitigation techniques for both forward and 
backward contamination were also discussed and iden-
tified. Participants identified crucial factors likely to 
impede hardware and system development with respect 
to potential PP requirements. Finally, key research and 
technology needs resulting from PP requirements were 
identified. Top-level findings include: 
• While there is a lack of explicit PP policies and re-
quirements for human missions to Mars, it is possi-
ble to outline a conceptual approach and provide 
preliminary guidelines for planners and designers. 
The development of more specific guidelines will 
occur in response to information from research and 
technology development activities coupled with 
findings from precursor robotic missions. 
• PP requirements for Mars missions will likely be 
very different than those used during Apollo mis-
sions. Early and regular coordination between the 
PP, scientific, planning, engineering, operations and 
medical communities is" needed to develop practica-
ble and effective designs for human operations on 
Mars. Coordination will bring numerous mutual ad-
vantages to the various programs such as identifying 
common needs for new technologies (e.g., among 
planetary science exploration, human mission opera-
tions, and PP). 
• Significant amounts of materials will originate from 
human life support and mobility systems that can be 
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classified as forward contamination in both PP and 
scientific terms. All materials from the Martian envi-
ronment are considered to be potential sources of 
back contamination (e.g., soil, airborne particulates). 
Forward and back contamination pathways include: 
leakage from habitat, airlocks and other vessels; 
egress/ingress of humans, materials and equipment; 
EVA operations; surface storage/disposal of wastes; 
gas venting (nominal and contingency); and thermal 
systems. Unintentional discharges may occur via 
events such as equipment failures, micrometeorite 
impacts, and rapid depressurization events. 
Additionally, there was general consensus among 
participants regarding the need to establish require-
ments for both PP and scientific investigations early in 
the development cycle, as they significantly affect sys-
tem design, technology trade options, development 
costs and possibly mission architecture. Of particular 
concern were the areas of discharge and disposal lim-
its, backward contamination limits, and in situ resource 
utilization (ISRU). It is necessary to identify and de-
fine what will be regarded as contaminants by both PP 
and science communities. In addition, there is a clear 
need to develop a classification system of zones of 
biological, scientific, contamination and operational 
importance prior to and during human missions. Final-
ly, data on protocols and systems used for quarantine 
of crew and hardware upon Earth return were identi-
fied as significant system drivers . 
It was concluded that it was not possible to provide 
quantitative PP guidelines at the time of the workshop, 
as PP requirements will evolve in response to numer-
ous factors . Instead, a tentative conceptual approach 
consistent with current PP requirements was proposed 
which asserts that human missions to Mars shall not 
affect or otherwise contaminate "special regions" of 
Mars, primarily through the use of cleaning operations 
and prudent landing site selection. It was also pro-
posed that calculations based on this approach will 
determine the tolerable levels of contamination al-
lowed for specific aspects of any particular human 
mission. Specific details of the approach are to be de-
termined, but will involve close collaboration with the 
scientific community, and the evaluation of unavoida-
ble levels of human-associated contaminants and their 
implications. 
To facilitate the process of developing a quantita-
tive set of PP requirements, the life support community 
indicated the need to further define initial material 
inventory, process products and by-products, release 
mechanisms associated with forward contamination, 
and the need to incorporate back contamination con-
trols into system design and operations. The EVA 
community focused on the need to identify and control 
forward/backward contamination regarding suits and 
rovers from vent/leakage constituents. The environ-
mental monitoring and control group noted the need 
for detection standards, response time requirements, 
and the challenges of identifying organisms that repre-
sent back contamination. 
It was noted that long-duration lunar missions can 
provide a relevant test-bed for many mission technolo-
gies. It was suggested that mission planners address PP 
technology on the Moon in a manner that mimics Mar-
tian exploration, despite the comparatively relaxed PP 
requirements of lunar missions. Finally, it was cau-
tioned that in planning long-term design and opera-
tions strategies, it will be critical to avoid pursuing two 
separate and costly technology pathways-one for the 
Moon and the other for Mars. 
The intent of this presentation is to provide the par-
ticipants of this workshop a brief summary of previous 
work on the topic1 1•21, and to provide a base for further-
ing the overall investigation and PP requirements de-
velopment. This presentation will provide an overall 
summary of the previous workshop that includes 
workshop objectives, starting assumptions, findings 
and recommendations. Specific result topics include 
the identification of knowledge and technology gaps, 
research and technology development needs, potential 
forward/backward contaminants and pathways, mitiga-
tion alternatives, and PP requirements definition needs. 
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PLANETARY PROTECTION FOR HUMAN EXPLORATION MISSIONS: A FLIGHT SURGEON'S 
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Planetary protection will be a challenge for future 
human exploration missions beyond the Earth-Moon 
system. Historically, human spaceflight programs have 
not dealt with planetary protection issues since Apollo 
14, the last manned mission to participate in the Lunar 
Quarantine Program after analysis of lunar materials 
demonstrated no biological threat. Whereas robotic 
missions are governed by NPR 8020.120 [1], which 
specifically defmes the planetary protection categories 
and corresponding requirements and constraints that 
must be met, there is no analogous guidance for human 
missions. A significant experience gap exists in the 
implementation of planetary protection requirements 
between robotic and human missions. 
Yet human missions will be orders of magnitude 
more complex than robotic missions. While the intent 
of planetary protection must still be met, the approach 
to preventing forward and backward contamination will 
have to be tailored to human missions. By their nature, 
human missions "will carry microbial populations that 
will vary in both kind and quantity," and "it will not be 
practicable to specifY all aspects of an allowable mi-
crobial population or potential contaminants at launch" 
[2]. Human missions must emphasize protective 
measures to prevent contamination, rather than biobur-
den accounting and microbial reduction as in the case 
for robotic missions. Human factors must be taken into 
account. Waste from human metabolism, crew activi-
ties, and payloads must be contained. 
At the same time, planetary protection needs to be 
taken into context with all the challenges facing human 
exploration missions. Vehicle considerations aside, 
there remains many poorly understood risks to the hu-
man body on such missions. NASA will fly its first 
year-long mission in 2015 in an effort to better under-
stand human physiological adaptation to microgravity, 
although this longest mission to date will still be much 
shorter than a mission to Mars. The effects of hypo-
gravity (e.g., 3/8 G on Mars) have yet to be character-
ized. Medical care for the crew will have to employ a 
different paradigm and greater crew autonomy. Crew 
health and wellbeing will be the utmost priority. 
Opportunities exist for collaboration between the 
space medical and planetary protection coinmunities. 
Both seek to understand the microbial composition of 
human missions and biochemical nature of planetary 
materials. Both have a vested interest in effective and 
efficient operations and protocols for contamination 
prevention, sample handling, and quarantine. Together, 
Space Medicine and Planetary Protection can develop 
guidelines and communicate them to the stakeholders. 
A collaborative approach will benefit both communi-
ties to support future human exploration missions. 
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tory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA; kjvenkat@jpl.nasa.gov 
Planetary protection policies derive from interna-
tional treaties whose goal is "to preserve our ability to 
study other worlds as they exist in their natural states; 
to avoid contamination that would obscure our ability 
to find life elsewhere-if it exists; and to ensure that 
we take prudent precautions to protect Earth's bio-
sphere in case it does." Mandates !ife in place to mini-
mize the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes as a re-
sult of human-associated cross-contamination between 
solar system bodies. 
To meet planetary protection obligations, NASA 
needs: 
o Integrated system technologies to protect human 
life from extraterrestrial microorganisms (should 
they exist) and to shield engineering systems 
from bio-corrosion. 
o Assurance of compliance with evolving stand-
ards for planetary protection (both forward and 
backward contamination) relating to the human 
exploration of Mars. 
o A sound technical basis to determine whether the 
inadvertent shedding of bio-contaminants from 
human explorers can be minimized to such a de-
gree that the search for life could continue in an 
unobstructed, meaningful manner. 
This presentation identifies a body of work to ad-
dress NASA needs relative to microbial monitoring 
and controlling the harmful impact of microbial corro-
sion. One of the present knowledge gaps revolves 
around developing an integrated microbial monitoring 
system that is validated in a terrestrial Mars analog 
environment and ready for deployment on a human 
mission to Mars. Such a system needs to be developed 
and is essential for human missions to comply with 
requirements to avoid harmful contamination and 
thereby facilitate the search for extraterrestrial life. The 
integrated microbial monitoring system will bolster 
confidence in, and lend support to, planetary protection 
efforts, hardware reliability, and sustained crew health. 
By forewarning human explorers of any significant 
fluctuations in microbial burden, the system allows the 
crew to take immediate action to significantly diminish 
any threat to crew health, or deterioration of the habita-
tion module resulting from bio-corrosion. This ap-
proach will strive to directly integrate the technologies 
proposed herein with those being developed for robotic 
Mars sample return missions, thereby providing a cra-
dle-to-grave planetary protection implementation ca-
pability for human exploration. 
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Past and current space missions in Earth orbit have demonstrated that men can survive and work in 
space for relative short durations. However, indoor microbial contamination in closed manned habitats 
leads to several environmental and health concerns, especially for longer duration space missions. Bio-
contamination in confined spacecraft is a hazard and potential risk for the health of the crew and for the 
on-board equipment. Therefore, space agencies have implemented specific measures to prevent bio-
contamination, to monitor it and to counteract it. 
In this presentation, I will give an overview of our knowledge on the current procedures implemented by 
different space agencies to control bio-contamination in manned spacecraft, the scientific knowledge 
and technological gaps that we identified and our research efforts to support and possibly improve the 
current operational procedures. This presentation includes the work performed and planned in the 
international studies MISSEX, COMICS, THESEUS, BIOSMHARS and BIOSIS. 
Prevention of bio-contamination should include rational habitat designs. Specific for the spread of 
biological aerosols, the development of a reliable model describing the bio-aerosol contamination 
spreading and development in closed manned habitat is important to pinpoint critical locations in a 
certain habitat design. BIOSMHARS is the first joint EU-Russia research project that addressed this issue. 
The first phase of the project aimed at developing, calibrating and validating a mathematical model to 
predict the dispersion of microbial bio-aerosols in the BIOS-facility, a closed environment in size and 
concept relevant for space, so far without human activity and under Earth conditions. The long-term 
objective of the BIOSMHARS-team is to develop a versatile and robust modelling tool for predicting 
airborne microbial contaminant dispersion and deposition in a manned spacecraft in flight. 
Nevertheless, microbes are and will always be present in manned space habitats, as man is their most 
important source. But if we can better understand the survival and proliferation strategies of the indoor 
microbial communities in confined manned habitats, it will help us to manage and control their sources, 
dispersion and concentrations, in benefit of the space crew health and well-being. An overview of 
microbial communities found inside the International Space Station and the Concord ia Antarctic base (an 
Earth analogue of a confined manned habitat) will be given. A detailed phenotypic and genetic analysis 
of bacterial water contaminants has taught us, how such bacteria of the Cupriavidus. genus, can adapt to 
and manage to survive the silver sanitation procedures in ISS. 
Within the THESEUS project an integrated life sciences research roadmap was written by Europe's 
scientific and industrial communities, in synergy with ESA, to (i) identify disciplinary research priorities, 
(ii) identify fields with high terrestrial application potential, and (iii) build a European network as the core 
of this strategy, for enabling future long-duration European human space exploration. This roadmap 
includes also recommendation on how to progress towards better microbiological quality control for the 
indoor environment in space in the future, and will be presented here. 
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Introduction: Wherever humans go, they inevita-
bly carry along the critters that live in and on them. 
Conventional wisdom has long held that it is unlikely 
those critters could survive the space environment, but 
in 2007 some microscopic aquatic animals called Tar-
digrades survived exposure to space [1] and in 2008 
Cyanobacteria lived for 548 days outside the ISS [2). 
Unlike the Mars rovers that were cleaned once and sent 
on their way, crew members will provide a constantly 
regenerating contaminant source. Are we prepared to 
certify that we can meet forward contamination proto-
cols as we search for life at new destinations? What 
about the organisms we might reasonably expect a 
crewed spacecraft to leak or vent? Do we even know 
what they are? How long might our tiny hitch-hikers 
survive in close proximity to a warm spacecraft that 
periodically leaks/vents water or oxygen and how 
might they mutate with long-duration exposure [3, 4]? 
How will these contaminants migrate from their source 
in conditions encountered in space or on other plane-
tary surfaces? This project aims to answer some of 
these questions by bringing together key stakeholder 
communities to develop a human forward contamina-
tion test, analysis, and integration plan. A system en-
gineering approach to identifY the experiments, analy-
sis, and modeling needed to develop the contamination 
control protocols required will be used as a roadmap to 
integrate the many different parts of this problem -
from launch to landing, living, and working on another 
planetary surface (Fig. 1). 
Implementation: The focus of this road-mapping 
effort will be ''what can we do now with what we 
have?" For example, the micro-organisms inside the 
International Space Station (ISS) are well-
characterized but no one has ever swabbed an ISS ex-
ternal vent to find out what (if anything) has managed 
to get outside. We can swab ISS vents now, without 
having to wait for program direction or an Orion or a 
new rocket. If we take a sample and find nothing, that's 
good news! It means that our environmental control 
and life support (ECLS) vent filters may already meet 
forward contamination requirements. If we do find 
organisms outside the ISS, it will be interesting to see 
how they compare with what we typically find inside. 
Are they the same? Or have they mutated? What cor-
rective measures can we take to prevent external con-
tarnination? Once we know what manages to escape a 
typical spaceship, we can expose it to various destina-
tion environments and see how it's likely to behave. 
Then we can go one step further, and test those organ-
isms in a spacecraft-induced environment to understand 
whether proximity to a warm, venting spaceship makes 
a difference. That will tell us how far away we must 
land from a sensitive area to mitigate forward contami-
nation. We could also bring the modeling community 
into play and overlay destination weather models onto 
bacterial growth models to estimate how far microbes 
could be transported by, say, a small dust storm on 
Mars. Another opportunity might be to take a sample 
from an Exploration Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 
Suit during development testing and follow similar 
steps as outlined above: what organisms come out of a 
suit vent or leak from the suit? How close can EVA 
crew be to a sensitive site without compromising the 
science objectives? Data would tell us what modifica-
tions might be required to the suit now, early in the 
development phase, and avoid an expensive redesign 
later. 
Technical Objectives and Outcomes: This project 
has four technical objectives: 
1. Develop a detailed test plan to leverage existing 
equipment (i.e. ISS) to characterize the kinds of or-
ganisms we can reasonably expect pressurized, 
crewed volumes to vent or leak overboard; 
2. Develop an analysis plan to study those organisms 
in relevant destination environments, including 
spacecraft-induced conditions; 
3. Develop a modeling plan to model organism 
transport mechanisms in relevant destination envi-
ronments; 
4. Develop a plan to disseminate findings and inte-
grate recommendations into exploration require-
ments & operations (Ops). 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): There will 
be different TRLs for different aspects of this project 
but because the emphasis is on utilizing what we cur-
rently have, TRLs are expected to be fairly high (ISS 
utilization, for example). 
Alignment to NASA and Johnson Space Center 
Strategic Objectives: This work will influence explo-
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ration-class life support and EVA suit design (includ-
ing whether closed loop is required to meet planetary 
· protection), and aid in developing crew health protec-
tion strategies. This work also supports one of 
NASA's Strategic Knowledge Gaps: Microbial survi-
val, Mars conditions (S].This project supports JSC 
Strategic Plan Goal #1: Lead Human Exploration, spe-
cifically Strategy 1.3 (Extend human exploration be-
yond LEO) by providing a roadmap to characterize 
human forward contamination. With that piece of the 
puzzle in place, we can better understand hardware and 
operational implications at various destinations beyond 
LEO. This work also aligns to NASA's strategic goals 
for exploration as designated in NASA's Space Tech-
nologies Roadmaps and Priorities [6] specifically 
Technology Area Breakdown numbers 6.0: Human 
Health, Life Support and Habitation Systems, and 7.0: 
Human Exploration Destination Systems Roadmap [7]. 
Project Infusion Path: This project's primary de-
liverable is a JSC-numbered document that will serve 
as the roadmap for many spin-off efforts, such as ISS 
utilization tests, advanced EVA and ECLSS develop-
ment, and crewed operational procedures. This work 
will link JSC's hardware developers with scientific 
communities across the Agency, and will provide in-
formation and guidance to commercial hardware de-
velopers planning crewed exploration missions. 
Fig.l. This project will provide a roadmap to integrate 
planetary protection requirements into the design of 
engineering systems necessary for human exploration 
of a variety of destinations. 
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PHOBOS AND DEIMOS: PLANETARY PROTECTION KNOWLEDGE GAPS FOR HUMAN MISSIONS. 
Pascal Lee1•2•3 and Kira Lorber1.4, 1Mars Institute, NASA Ames Research Center, MS 245-3, Moffett Field; CA 
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Summary: Phobos and Deirnos, Mars' two moons, 
are associated with significant planetary protection 
knowledge gaps for human missions, that may be filled 
by a low cost robotic reconnaissance mission focused 
on elucidating their origin and volatile content. 
Introduction: Phobos and Deimos are currently 
considered to be potentially worthwhile destinations 
for early human missions to Mars orbit, and possibly in 
the context of longer term human Mars exploration 
strategies as well [1] (Fig. 1). Until recently, it was 
widely considered that planetary protection (PP) con-
cerns associated· with the exploration of Phobos and 
Deimos would be fundamentally no different from 
those associated with the exploration of primitive 
NEAs [2], as the preponderance of scientific evidence 
suggested that 1) there was never liquid water on Pho-
bos and Deimos, except possibly very early in their 
history; 2) there is no metabolically useful energy 
source except near their heavily irradiated surface; 3) 
there was likely never sufficient organic matter on or 
in these bodies to support life within the zone where 
metabolically useful energy is available, because of 
space radiation; 4) subsequent to the disappearance of 
liquid water, these bodies have not been subjected to 
extreme temperatures (i.e., > 160°C), except near the 
irradiated surface zone as a result of impacts; 5) there 
is, and was, sufficient irradiation for biological sterili-
zation of terrestrial life form near the surface; and 6) 
there has likely been a natural influx to Earth, via me-
teorites, of material equivalent to a sample returned 
from the target body. 
However, two recent developments relating to the 
origin ofPhobos and Deirnos are prompting a revisit of 
PP assessments for these bodies: 
Giant Impact Hypothesis. In addition to the two 
classical hypotheses concerning the origin of Phobos 
and Deimos (namely that they might be captured small 
bodies from the outer main belt, or remnants of Mars' 
formation), a third hypothesis is now commonly cited: 
that they might be reaccreted Mars Impact ejecta. The 
latter includes the possibility that Phobos and/or Dei-
mos formed less than 0.5 Ga ago, and are made of 
Martian crustal material ejected from Mars's near-
surface environment by a large impact. Given the pos-
sibility of this scenario (if not its plausibility: giant 
impacts are unlikely in recent times), it can no longer 
be said with the same confidence that there is a pre-
ponderance of evidence for the six inferences listed 
above. 
Figure 1: Deimos (left) and Phobos (right), to scale. 
Deimos is 15 km long, and Phobos, 27 km long. Both 
moons have, to first order, a D-type spectrum: they are 
very dark (albedo - 0.07) and very red. (NASA MRO). 
Extinct Comet Hypothesis. As a variant of the 
"captured small body from the outer main belt" hy-
pothesis, it has long been suggested that Phobos and/or 
Deimos might be captured comet nuclei. (now inactive 
or extinct). Consistent with this idea, some grooves on 
Phobos (those resembling crater chains, or catenas) are 
interpreted as fissures lined with vents through which 
volatiles were once outgassed [3] (Fig. 2). 
Figure 2: Crater chain-like grooves on Phobos have 
been interpreted as fissures with vents through which 
volatiles once outgassed. (NASA Viking Orbiter 1). 
While the grooves on Phobos could have an en-
tirely different origin, recent outgassing activity de-
tected around D-type NEA 3552 Don Quixote revives 
the extinct comet hypothesis for Phobos and Deimos. 
The key facts and observations are as follows: 
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a) All 3 are D-type objects: Phobos, Deimos, and 
NEA 3552 Don Quixote all present, to flrst order, aD-
type spectrum, ie., they are very dark and very red in 
the visible and near-IR; 
b) D-types are rare in the inner solar system: Only 
36 NEAs are known to be of D-type, i.e. only 1.5% of 
NEAs whose spectral type has been determined; 
c) Phobos & Deimos are exceptionally large as in-
ner solar system small bodies: If Phobos and Deimos 
were to be included in the NEO population, they would 
rank #3 and #5 in size, respectively; 
d) NEA 3552 Don Quixote is exceptionally large as 
well. Don Quixote would rank #4 in size, i.e., it is in-
termediate in size between Phobos and Deimos (Fig. 
3). Thus, although D-type objects are rare among 
NEAs, three of the flve largest small bodies in the in-
ner solar system have a D-type spectrum; 
Figure 3: Deimos (top left), NEA 3552 Don Quixote 
(bottom left), NEA Itokawa (top right), and Phobos 
(bottom right), to scale. (NASA & JAX.A). 
e) NEA 3552 Don Quixote is a comet nucleus. Ever 
since Don Quixote's discovery, it has been suggested 
that it might be an extinct comet, as it revolves around 
the sun on a highly inclined (30°), Jupiter and Mars-
crossing orbit, and is spectrally akin to small bodies 
found in the outer main belt and beyond. In early 2014, 
however, 3552 Don Quixote was observed to display 
comet-like activity, with a coma and tail associated 
with C02 emission [4]. Rather than being extinct, it is 
a moderately active comet nucleus. 
Thus, given that Phobos and Deimos are similar to 
3552 Don Quixote in both size and spectral type (al-
bedo and color), and these have uncommon values 
among inner solar system small bodies (they are large 
objects and of spectral type D), the hypothesis that 
Phobos and Deimos might be captured comet nuclei 
that are now extinct or largely inactive merits serious 
consideration. Their low bulk densities, which is gen-
erally attributed to an interior with high macroscopic 
porosity, is also consistent with a volatile-rich interior. 
If a volatile-rich interior is a likely possibility, then PP 
assessments of Phobos and Deimos would need be to 
revised. 
While surface and near-surface materials on Pho-
bos and Deimos are likely to be depleted in volatiles as 
a result of diffusive exposure to space and impact 
processing, the deeper interior might remain volatile 
rich. As new technologies (such as plasma drilling [5] 
(Fig. 4)) designed to access and sample the deeper in-
terior of planetary bodies, including air less small bod-
ies, are now emerging, human exploration will likely 
not remain confined to sampling surface and near-
surface materials, but will likely include interacting 
with deeper interior materials on Phobos and Deimos, 
including potential volatiles. 
Figure 4: Plasma drilling opens the possibility for hu-
man explorers to access and sample, the deeper interior 
of small bodies such as Phobos or Deimos (Zaptec ). 
Conclusion: The volatile content, and therefore the 
origin and evolution, of Phobos and Deimos, are major 
PP knowledge gaps for future human missions to these 
bodies. To better constrain PP requirements associated 
with their exploration, a robotic reconnaissance mis-
sion to Phobos and Deimos focused on investigating 
their origin and assessing their volatile content is rec-
ommended. Short-term options include low-cost and 
low-risk Discovery class missions such as P ADME 
(Phobos And Deimos & Mars Environment) [6]. 
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OVERVIEW OF MICROBIAL MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES CONSIDERED FOR USE INSIDE 
LONG DURATION SPACEFLIGHTS AND PLANETARY HABITATS. M. C. Roman1 and C. M. Ott2, 
1NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Mail Code FPlO, Huntsville, AI 35812 monsi.roman@nasa.gov; 2 NASA 
Johnson Space Center, 2101 Nasa Parkway, Houston, TX 77058 c.m.ott@nasa.gov 
Abstract: Humans have been exploring space for 
more than 40 years. For all those years, microorgan-
isms have accompanied both un-manned space-
craft/cargo and manned vessels. Microorganisms are 
everywhere on Earth, could easily adapt to new envi-
ronments, and/or can rapidly mutate to survive in very 
harsh conditions. Their presence in spacecraft and car-
go have caused a few inconveniences over the years of 
human spaceflight, ranging from health problems, life 
support systems challenges, and material degradation. 
The sterilization of spacecraft that will host humans in 
long duration mission to prevent forward contamina-
tion would be a costly operation that will not provide a 
long-term solution to the unavoidable microbial colo-
nization of the vessels. As soon as a human is exposed 
to the disinfected spacecraft, microorganisms will start 
populating the new environment. As the human pres-
ence in space increases in length, the risk from the 
microbial load to hardware and crew will also increase. 
Mitigation of this risk of forward contamination in-
volves several different strategies that will include 
minimizing the microbial load (in numbers and diversi-
ty), understanding where microorganisms can be trans-
ferred from the crew/vehicle to the planet, and micro-
biological monitoring to verify our successful mitiga-
tion. NASA has been looking at microbial monitoring 
teclmologies that could be used in long duration mis-
sions. This presentation will provide an overview of 
the microorganisms found on spacecraft and microbial 
monitoring technologies that are been considered for 
use inside spacecrafts and planetary habitats. 
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Current Trends of High-Throughput Methods for Planetary Protection Requirements Associated with a Hu-
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Introduction: Future human extraterrestrial mis-
sions, and missions to Mars in particular, will be ex-
tremely challenging to operate. Such mission will re-
quire a sophisticated bioregenerative life support sys-
tem while in orbit and efficient in-situ utilization sys-
tems while on the surface to manage and produce all 
the needed resources (oxygen, water, waste, etc.) to 
support human activities [1-2]. Most likely consortia of 
specialized, adapted, or engineered microorganisms 
will be intentionally introduced or used for such efforts 
[3]. Furthermore, the presence of humans will have a 
considerable impact on the level of bioburden, as it has 
been established that a human body carries 100 times 
more microbes than human cells [ 4). 
Therefore, in order to fulfill planetary protection 
requirements regarding forward and backward contam-
ination, microbial population in both kind and quantity 
will have to be monitored and evaluated throughout the 
mission. The emergence of advanced molecular assays 
and high-throughput techniques of system biology is of 
special importance to planetary protection. Using such 
systems it can efficiently assessed what are the levels 
of bioburden, qualitatively or quantitatively estimate 
the level of biodiversity, and track genetic changes 
induced by the harshness of space environments [5]. 
For example, cytological (flow cytometry) and Bi-
omarker (Limulus Amebocyte Lysate and ATP assays) 
methods have been used to assess the level of biobur-
den. However, high-throughput mass spectrometry and 
PCR-based techniques either individually or in con-
junction with DNA microarrays are more suitable ap-
proaches to infer diversity. Finally, sequencing meth-
ods are capable of identifying genetic changes, induced 
by space radiation in particular, that occur in microbial 
communities during their journey [6-8]. 
The effects of space environments on biological 
systems are influenced by many factors and should be 
studied using global, integrative methods. This, in turn, 
implies that "omics" approaches are not only helpful 
but are indispensable for planetary protection [5]. We 
will discuss which "omics" technologies are currently 
amenable to adaptations for space applications and 
how these adaptations can be achieved [8]. We will 
review ongoing efforts aimed in this direction and dis-
cuss scientific benefits that they might bring. In par-
ticular, we will argue that, with sufficient commitment, 
at least some instruments for high-throughput methods 
could be ready for deployment on-board spacecraft in 
the next few years. Once developed and deployed, 
"omics" tools can be used for a wide variety of high-
value studies on biological systems ranging from mi-
croorganisms to humans for planetary protection and 
human health purposes. 
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NEAR REAL-TIME QUANTITATION OF VIABLE MICROORGANISMS FOR PLANETARY 
PROTECTION AND CREW HEALTH. N.R. Wainwright, Charles River Laboratories, 1023 Wappoo Rd., Suite 
43-B, Charleston, SC 29407, norm.wainwright@crl.com 
Introduction: The need for rapid assessment of 
microbial bioburden is practically universal. This is as 
true for Planetary Protection and Crew Health as it is in 
the Biopharmaceutical and Food Sciences. For Plane-
tary Protection, the lmowledge of when minimum ac-
ceptable levels of contamination are exceeded is criti-
cal to keeping flight hardware in specification as manu-
facturing and assembly proceed. It is equally critical to 
mission science, especially when potential life detec-
tion science that may be impacted. For Crew Health, 
presence of potential pathogens are of primary concern. 
Whether detection methods are focused on preventative 
measures to keep environments clean, or on clinical 
diagnostic procedures that could help diagnose and 
treat infection, procedures and equipment to rapidly 
and simply provide information to the crew is para-
mount. We have developed a technology for the Rio-
pharmaceutical field to detect and count viable micro-
organisms in a sample, without the need to culture, in 
about an hour. Sensitivity is as low as a single cell in a 
given volume. The robustness and portability of the 
system is amenable to both Planetary Protection and 
Crew Health requirements. 
Background: Earlier work focusing on non-
culture methods included measurement of ATP by the 
luciferin!luciferase system and bacterial endotoxin 
(LPS or lipopolysaccharide) by Limulus Amebocyte 
Lysate (LAL). Both of these methods have been ap-
proved as ancillary Planetary Protection testing meth-
ods [1]. From 2006 - 2009, we tested LAL on the In-
ternational Space Station (ISS) as a technology demon-
stration (LOCAD-PTS). Much useful information and 
valuable experience was gained during that study in 
quantifying microbial contamination on surfaces 
(2,3,4]. However, we always realized that direct, se-
lective measurement of viable organisms by non-
culture methods was the ultimate objective. 
New Technological Approach: To achieve the 
sensitivity required in the minimal time available, we 
designed a system with three major components, sam-
ple acquisition, fluorescent viability staining and laser 
scanning. 
Figure 1. Full system shown with door open, revealing 
the rotary stage and optics module. A touch screen on 
top controls the unit. Approximate size: 1 cubic foot. 
Sample acquisition. Samples should be suspended 
in an aqueous solution, either directly from a liquid or 
extracted from a surface or solid material. These can 
be loaded directly in a 10 1-11 capillary, or concentrated 
by deposition on a filter membrane, shown below. 
Figure 2. Left: 100 ml filter cup assembly; center: 
membrane with cup removed; right: 101-11 capillary. 
Fluorescent viability stain. Selective visualization 
of viable cells relies on a combination of dyes that ac-
cumulate in cells and a quencher that is only permeable 
to dead cells. A number of dye I quencher combina-
tions are available that are directed to a number of tar-
gets, such as nucleic acids, redox reactions and ester-
ase. In addition, fluorescent particles (0.8 ll) can be 
included as positive controls. Data from several exam-
ples will be presented. 
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Figure 3. Upper panel: live and dead cells in phase 
contrast microscopy; lower panel: same field under 
fluorescence only. 
Laser scanner. The scanner has a unique rotary 
mechanisms capable of scanning both membrane filters 
and capillaries. The system is comprised of a rotary 
stage on which the medium is held, a laser directing a 
collimated beam onto the medium to excite the fluoro-
chrome stained cells, and an optic module housing 
three photomultipliers, each capturing a portion of the 
total emitted light spectrum. 
~ 
Figure 4. The rotary stage is shown with three mem-
branes being scanned simultaneously. 
Following a scan, software analyzes the number, posi-
tion, color and intensity of fluorescence for each cell or 
control particle. Very strict criteria are set to eliminate 
false positives. Scan time is approximately 20 minutes 
for the three membranes (or four capillaries). Coupled 
to 15 - 30 minute stain time, the total assay time is less 
than an hour. As a validation of the process, the mem-
brane filters may be placed on nutrient agar to grow 
and count colonies. A number of examples will be 
presented. 
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COMPREHENSIVE AND SENSITIVE MICROBIAL DETECTION USING A BROAD SPECTRUM 
DETECTION MICROARRAY. C. Jaing, S. Gardner, K. McLoughlin, J. Allen, J. Thissen, N. Be, T. Slezak, Law-
rence Livermore National Laboratory (7000 East Ave., Livermore, CA, 94550, jaing2@llnl.gov). 
Molecular detection of microbes: Recent advances 
in genomic-based technologies have revolutionized the 
field of microbial ecology and their influence on infec-
tious diseases in human [1]. PCR and DNA sequencing 
approaches have been widely used for pathogen detec-
tion and characterization. PCR assays are limited, in that 
only a single or few organisms can be investigated per 
assay, with potentially high false-positive rates. While 
DNA sequencing can identify a larger scope of organ-
isms, current DNA sequencing analysis methods are 
lengthy, costly and require significant computational 
time, and there is a lack ofbioinformatic tools to rapidly 
identify and quantify abundances of species identified in 
a sample. In an effort to improve high-throughput analy-
sis and detection, we have developed an innovative mi-
croarray platform called the Lawrence Livermore Mi-
crobial Detection Array (LLMDA) to probe for all 
known microbiological agents for which whole genomes, 
segments and plasmid sequences are available [2]. 
The LLMDA: The LLMDA technology can be ap-
plied to large numbers of environmental and clinical 
samples in a highly sensitive, specific, and cost-
effective fashion. The recently updated LLMDA con-
tains 180,000 probes designed to detect genomic DNA 
and eDNA from all currently sequenced microbial 
pathogens, a total of 10261 species, including 4219 
viral, 5367 bacterial, 293 archaeal, 265 fungal, and 117 
protozoan species that were sequenced through June, 
2013. This microarray targets both conserved and 
unique genomic regions of sequenced microbial strains. 
It has higher probe density and broader taxonomic rep-
resentation of viral, bacterial, and fungal genome se-
quences than other published array designs [3] . The 
automated data analysis algorithm, Composite Likeli-
hood Maximization (CLiMax), is integrated with a web 
interface that enables LLMDA data analysis within 30 
minutes. 
LLMDA in human health applications: LLMDA 
was recently established as a potential diagnostic plat-
form for identification of viral pathogens in human 
clinical samples [ 4]. As little as 5 input genome copies 
(~1 ,000 copies/ml) ofBK polyomavirus were clearly 
detected by LLMDA in urine samples after phi29 am-
plification [4]. Additionally, the LLMDA successfully 
identified other viral agents such as human papilloma-
virus, human herpesviruses, enteroviruses, and adena-
viruses in a variety of human sample types including 
nasal swabs, urine, stool, serum, and cerebrospinal 
fluid [4]. In an another study, LLMDA identified hu-
man herpes virus 8, or Kaposi's sarcoma-associated 
virus from human bladder cancer samples, indicating 
viral infection may play a role in tumorigensis of blad-
der cancer [5]. In a collaborative study with the Naval 
Medical Research Center, the LLMDA was used to 
proftle the microbial contents from wounded soliders. 
The array detected at least one pathogen from 30% of 
the samples that were negative by microbiological cul-
ture testing [6]. Additionally, the LLMDA bas found 
that certain bacteria, such as Acenitobacter baumaii are 
assoiated with wounds that failed to heal, wherees 
E. coli species are associated with wounds that did heal, 
indicating that microbial profiles could be linked to 
wound outcome and could be used to better inform 
treatment decisions. 
LLMDA in detecting vaccine contamination and 
drug safety: In 2010, the LLMDA identified a porcine 
circovirus in the Rotarix vaccine [7,8]. This was the 
first study to report an adventitious contaminating virus 
from childhood vaccines, which demonstrated that 
LLMDA is a sensitive and powerful technology for 
vaccine safety monitoring. Currently, the LLMDA is 
being evaluated as a tool for risk assessment in phar-
maceutical industry. 
LLMDA in environmental monitoring: The 
LLMDA technology has been evaluated in microbial 
detection in environmental air and soil samples. 
LLMDA detected as little as I 00 genome copies of B. 
anthracis in spiked environmental air and soil samples, 
similar in sensitivity to next-generation metagenomic 
sequencing [9]. In a collaborative study with JPL, the 
utility of LLMDA in detecting bacteria from environ-
mental samples collected at the ISS was evaluated. The 
LLMDA successfully detected P. acnes, S. aureas, S. 
epidermidis and S. cohnii, confirming previous results 
by sequencing. 
LLMDA 
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Comparison to DNA sequencing: The advantage 
of the LLMDA in speed and cost over next-generation 
sequencing was recently demonstrated in the field of 
archaeology [10]. The array successfully identified 
previously verified bacterial human pathogens, includ-
ing Vibrio cholerae (cholera) in a 19th century intesti-
nal specimen and Yersinia pestis ("Black Death" 
plague) in a medieval tooth, which represented only 
minute fractions (0.03% and 0.08% alignable high-
throughput shotgun sequencing reads) of their respec-
tive DNA content. LLMDA can identifY primary 
and/or co-infecting bacterial pathogens in highly de-
graded and complex ancient samples, thereby serving 
as a rapid and inexpensive screening tool to study 
health across both space and time. The LLMDA is cur-
rently being developed into a 96-well format microarry 
to facilitate even higher throughput environmal and 
clinical microbiome studies. 
Tbe Livermore Metagenomics Analysis Toolkit: 
Livermore Metagenomic Analysis Toolkit (LMAT) is a 
collection of software tools designed to identify the 
genes and organisms present in a shotgun metagenomic 
sample [11]. LMAT maintains the most complete col-
lection of microbial genomes and genes publicly avail-
able in a rapidly searchable form. The database in-
c! udes all publically sequenced strains of viruses, bac-
teria, archaea, fungi, protozoa, and eukaryote mito-
chondria and an extensive collection of human genetic 
variation derived from the 1000 human genomes pro-
ject. The database covers 12,632 species and stores 
116 gigabases of searchable genomic data, which is 
roughly 3 times larger than any other published search-
able database available for metagenomic search. 
LMA T ensures consistently fast runtimes and maintains 
high accuracy by using strain-specific k-mers (where k 
is typically 20 nucleotides), searching for common 
elelments only once. LMA T has been used to analyze 
many terabases of metagenomic data and provide novel 
insights on organisms present that were not previously 
considered. For example, LMAT was recently run on 
the complete 18 terabase collection ofbuman microbi-
ome shotgun metagenomic samples and discovered a 
large collection of previously unidentified human ge-
nomic contaminants as well as candidate novel mi-
crobes. 
Summary: We have developed a suite of genomic 
and bioinformatic tools including the Lawrence Liver-
more Microbial Detection Array and Metagenomics 
Analysis toolkit, scalable and easily adaptable to sup-
port space biology and the human extraterrittrial mis-
sions. The tools are highly sensitive and specific for 
genomic analysis and molecular characterization of 
human health and microbiomes, and to profile microbi-
al contents in the environment. 
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Current Progresses Of Midass: The European Project For An Automated Microbial Identification Instrument 
Claude Mabilat1• , Hafid Abaibou1, Robert Lindner, Stephanie Reffestin3 and Christophe Lasseur3 
1bioMerieux S.A. (France), 2NTE-Sener (Spain), 3ESA-ESTEC (The Netherlands) 
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For the long term manned missions, microbial contamination is a major risk for exobiology research, crew members 
and hardware. Rapid molecular biology techniques offer an attractive alternative to traditional culture-based 
methods. They allow fast time to results for contamination detection and quick implementation of appropriate 
corrective action when required. However, to date, there are no such available system due to the technical challenges 
required to meet the sensitivity and specificity needs of the test and the requirement for full automation, from 
sampling to results interpretation. In response to this, over the last decade, the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
bioMerieux initiated a co-development of MIDASS, the world's first fully automated system for the monitoring of 
the environmental microbial load in confined spaces, including clean rooms and hospital wards. The system is based 
on molecular technologies (sample preparation/amplification/detection) and enables rapid and simple determination 
of the microbiological contamination level in less than 3 hours. It relies on NASBA-amplification for the detection of 
selected micro-organisms (indicators or pathogens) at determined risk-levels (200 and 1 CFU 1m3 air, respectively). 
Successful progresses were recently made for the space-application workpackage of this project : a lab-on-a-card 
design for air-testing in a first scope was endorsed by a successful ESA Preliminary Design Review, paving the way 
to spatialization steps (phases C and D). Data will be presented with regards to system design and biological 
performances. 
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The Sloan Foundation Microbiology of the Built Environment program: What's there? Where does it come 
from? And what does it mean? Paula .J. Olsiewski, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 630 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2200, 
New York, NY 10111 (olsiewski@sloan.org) 
Introduction: From 2000-2010, the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation funded a program that provided 
$45MM in grants to reduce the threat of bioterrorism. 
An important aspect of that program was fi.mding work 
to make buildings safer against microbial and other 
biological threats. Through this work, it became ap-
parent that there was no baseline or catalog for indoor 
microbes. As a result, in 2004, Sloan began supporting 
basic research in this area by coaxing prominent life 
scientists Norman Pace and J. Craig Venter to move 
from studying natural outdoor environments to indoor 
built environments. 
The Microbiology of the Built Environment 
Program: 
Since 2004, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation has 
provided over 100 grants for a total of$38MM in fund-
ing. Sloan grantees have been asking three main ques-
tions: 1. What's there? 2. Where does it come from? 
3. What does it mean? To address these questions, 
Sloan grantees have been using both life science and 
building science tools. They also have been develop-
ing new methodologies. It is expected that findings 
from this program will lead to better approaches for 
designing, constructing, and operating buildings. 
Grantees include engineer and ecologist Jessica Green 
of the University of Oregon, ecologist Jack Gilbert of 
the University of Chicago, and environmental engineer 
William Nazaroff of UC Berkeley. The presentation 
will share some of the recent fmdings and describe 
plans for future grant-making opportunities. 
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SURFACE SAMPLING AND DETECTION INVESTIGATIONS AT THE CDC. L. J. Rose1 and A. D. Coul-
liette2, (1 Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd, 
MS C-16, Atlanta GA 20329. LRose@cdc.gov) emvision of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd, MS C-16, Atlanta GA 20329. ACoulliette@cdc.gov). 
Introduction: The Environmental and Applied 
Microbiology Team is a group of microbiologists 
within the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion 
that is tasked with investigating disease outbreaks in 
hea1thcare settings. During the course of these investi-
gations, questions have arisen as to the efficiency of the 
available sampling and detection methods. In order to 
better understand and optimize sampling and detection 
of microorganisms, the team has undertaken several 
applied research endeavors. This presentation will 
summarize and discuss some of our work and fmdings. 
Sampling devices: The team has investigated the 
efficiency of devices such as swabs [1], sponges [2], 
gauze wipes and vacuum devices [3] to pick up a varie-
ty of organisms from several surface types and the effi-
ciency of the devices to release the organisms into 
solution. Organisms evaluated include multi-drug re-
sistant bacteria such as Methicillin resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA), Clostridium difficile spores, 
and Acinetobacter baumanii, as well as biothreat or-
ganisms like Bacillus anthracis spores. 
Surface: The efficiency of the sampling and detec-
tion is influenced by the characteristics of the surface 
materials the organisms are sampled from, such as 
roughness, porosity and hydrophobicity. Each sampling 
device also has a limit as to the surface area that is op-
timum to sample before efficiency is lost. We investi-
gated the use of composite sampling for one study[4], 
in which each side of one sponge sampling device was 
used for several sites in a room. 
Detection: Culture has been the primary method of 
detection for the organisms investigated, since we have 
found that the limit of detection is significantly lower 
than for detection with molecular methods such as 
qPCR, and because we need to know the organism is 
viable. The sampling and detection method should 
therefore be chosen based on the objectives of the 
sampling and how the results can inform decisions and 
actions required to protect public health. 
. Culture Gaps. Growth of the target organisms 
without overgrowth of background organisms has been 
a challenge. Though selective media is available for 
some of our target organisms, they are not always time 
efficient or effective for a given environmental consor-
tia. In addition, after disinfection or dessication, organ-
isms may be injured and viable but non-culturable, 
leading to false negative detection results. 
Molecular Detection Gaps. Limit of detection is a 
significant gap. Though PCR assays can be sensitive, 
since typically a volume of only 5)lL is in the reaction 
well, concentration of the sample eluate without con-
centration of background organisms and/or assay in-
hibitors is required, and bas proven to be a challenge. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR MARS :MISSIONS - ISSUES 
AND CONCERNS FOR PLANETARY PROTECTION. D.J. Barta and M.S. Anderson, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston, TX, 77058. danielJ.barta@nasa.gov, molly.s .anderson@nasa,gov 
Introduction: Planetary protection represents an 
additional set of requirements that generally have not 
been considered by developers of technologies for 
Environmental Control and Life Support Systems 
(ECLSS). Planetary protection guidelines will affect 
the kind of operations, processes, and functions that 
can take place during future human planetary explora-
tion missions. 
Forward Contamination: Forward contamination 
concerns will affect release of gases and discharge of 
liquids and solids, including what may be left behind 
after planetary vehicles are abandoned upon return to 
Earth. A crew of four using a state of the art ECLSS 
could generate as much as 4.3 metric tons of gaseous, 
liquid and solid wastes and trash, and 2 metric tons of 
used hardware during a 500-day surface stay. This 
rate includes the fact that state-of-the-art ECLSS tech-
nology such as that currently on the International 
Space Station includes partial waste recycling. Certain-
ly, further closure of ECLSS systems will be of benefit 
by greater reuse of consumable products and reduced 
generation of waste products. But how must these 
wastes be managed? It will be cost prohibitive to re-
turn these wastes to Earth. Process technologies to 
treat, sanitize, mineralize or permanently store these 
products will add to launch mass requirements. 
It can be presumed that planetary protection will 
affect technology development by constraining how 
technologies can operate: limiting or prohibiting cer-
tain kinds of operations or processes (e.g. venting); 
necessitating that other kinds of operations be per-
formed (e.g. sterilization; filtration of vent lines); pro-
hibiting what can be brought on a mission (e.g. ex-
tremophiles); creating needs for new capabili-
ties/technologies (e.g. containment). 
Although any planned venting could include filtra-
tion to eliminate micro-organisms from inadvertently 
exiting the spacecraft, it may be impossible to elimi-
nate or filter habitat structural leakage. Filtration will 
add pressure drops impacting size of lines and ducts, 
affect fan size and energy requirements, and add con-
sumable mass. Contingency operations such as cabin 
depress for fire response may have to be reconsidered, 
necessitating additional hardware such as scrubbers for 
post-fire cleanup. 
Technologies that may be employed to remove bio-
markers and microbial contamination from liquid and 
solid wastes prior to storage or release may include 
mineralization technologies such ao; incineration, super 
critical wet oxidation and pyrolysis; howev~r these 
come with significant penalties for mass, power and 
consumables. Additionally, operations of current and 
historical human spacecraft without planetary protec-
tion needs have not led to strong demand for these 
technologies, and their development lags behind other 
functions . More detailed knowledge is needed for 
what specific chemical and organic materials are ac-
ceptable to be vented or left behind without treatment. 
Are there concerns for non-biological contamination 
for reasons other than planetary protection, such as for 
protection of science? 
Backward Contamination: Developers of life 
support systems have several concerns related to 
backward contamination, both physical and biological. 
The life support system may be an important step in 
minimizing the backward contamination, or have to 
react to that contamination happening. 
The life support system is a critical part of minimiz-
ing the effects of backward contamination from dust or 
regolith on the Martian surface. Characterizing the 
properties of Martian dust before human missions is 
clearly important. Knowing the impacts on human 
health will set the limits of allowable contamination, 
and knowing other characteristics will help design 
efficient technologies for control and removal of the 
dust. However, it's also very important to estimate the 
amount of dust that will be brought into the habitat 
during nominal or contingency operations. Suitports 
and other layered defense strategies can minimize the 
dust or regolith brought deeper into the habitat, but it 
will not completely eliminate it. While it may be ob-
vious, it's important to point out that the vehicle life 
support system removes dust or regolith after the 
crewmember has been exposed. It will not be a perfect 
barrier. Medical communities should be assuming 
some level of contact between the crewmembers and 
the Martian environment is inevitable. 
A second backward contamination issue important 
to the design of the life support system is the use of in-
situ resources. The essential issue is whether medical 
experts will allow human consumption (through drink-
ing or atmospheric contact and metabolic use) of con-
sumables generated from the Martian surface and at-
mosphere. Are there additional monitoring or meas-
urement requirements that need to be placed on either 
the ECLSS or ISRU system to validate quality? There 
is a knowledge gap (at least within the ECLSS com-
munity) as to what contaminants will be present in 
ISRU generated consumables that would be different 
from either Earth supplied consumables or resources 
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from recycled wastes. The contaminants will likely 
vary depending on process (melting ice vs. chemically 
reacting atmospheric components). If particular types 
of consumables will never be acceptable, that places an 
important constraint on mission and system architec-
ture. The standards currently in place for water and air 
quality are typically based on describing allowable 
quantities for expected contaminants. The require-
ments and specifications used in ISS are likely not 
sufficient to describe the requirements for fluids and 
environments during exploration missions. For exam-
ple, perchlorates and chromium do not appear in the 
Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines (SWEGs). 
Since some backward contamination is likely inevi-
table, the need for quarantine is an important consider-
ation for life support design. If a crewmember devel-
ops symptoms of illness after exposure, will the life 
support system have to provide an isolated atmosphere 
and water system to act as a medical quarantine? This 
essentially results in a doubling of life support func-
tions and significant increase in vehicle size. If the 
quarantine is short term, simpler units may be used, 
but duration becomes highly important. And if waste 
must be disposed of after the quarantine period as if it 
were a biohazard, that also introduces difficult new 
requirements. Quarantine may also be provided by 
separation through the operation of distinct mission 
vehicles, with an attempt to minimize cross contamina-
tion when the crew transfers from the surface ele-
ments, to an ascent vehicle, to a transit habitat, and 
back into the Orion vehicle. The timing of these 
moves is based on orbital mechanics, and cannot be 
adjusted to wait out an illness. Thus, medical quaran-
tine may need to be considered for all vehicle ele-
ments. 
Closing Comments: Ultimately , there will be an 
effect on mission costs, including the mission trade 
space when planetary protection requirements begin to 
drive vehicle deisgn in a concrete way. Planetary pro-
tection requirements need to be considered early in 
technology development and mission programs in or-
der to estimate these impacts and push back on re-
quirements or find efficient ways to perform necessary 
functions. It is expected that planetary protection will 
be a significant factor during technology selection and 
system architecture design for future missions. 
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Human Life support by microbes in space 
Leys N. \ Janssen P. \ Monsieurs P. 1, Mastro leo F._1 
1 Belgian Nuclear Research Center SCK•CEN, Mol, Belgium 
Natalie.Leys@sckcen.be 
1029.pdf 
To ensure that man can survive and work in space for long durations (e.g. on the moon or on Mars) and 
to reduce the costs of these expeditions to feasible levels, technological and scientific breakthroughs in 
life support systems and related recycling technologies are required. A number of recommendations 
how this could be developed in the future were recently formulated by us, together with a group of 
European experts, within the THESEUS roadmap. 
The large potential of bio-based systems for human life support in space was included. On Earth, life 
exists thanks to microbes, and we use them every day for producing our food, for our health and well-
being, and for maintaining a viable environment. Such water and soil microbes will also have useful 
applications in space, including the recycling of valuable mineral and organic substrates. In this 
presentation, we discuss how bacteria can be used in closed life support systems to support human life 
in space, taking the MELISSA system as model. Since 1989, the MELiSSA project groups a number of 
European and Canadian scientists and industrial partners to investigate and demonstrate how microbes 
can transform organic waste into fertilizers for algae and plant cultures, which in turn will produce 
oxygen, purify drinking water, and provide fresh food for man in space habitats. In parallel, we are 
looking, together with a team of gee-microbiology experts, into the potential application of microbes to 
make planetary regolith suitable for agriculture. 
That microbes can survive and proliferate in space habitats is well documented. But for microbes to be 
successfully used in biotechnological applications in space, their interaction with water, soil, and rock 
substrates under space conditions has to be studied, particularly because these microbes will be exposed 
to extended periods of extreme conditions including high radiation, low gravity, low pressure, low and/or 
high temperatures, and complex chemical compositions. Thus, in this presentation, also the challenges 
to optimiz~ the desired bacterial activity under space conditions will be discussed. We will give a small 
overview of what is known, from former flight and ground experiments, on the effects of such space 
environmental factors on the survival, proliferation, and metabolic activity of water- and soil microbes, 
or ecologically engineered communities thereof. Our plans for future flight experiments to further 
investigate this issue will also be expla ined. 
Acknowledgments : The authors thank ESA, Belspo, and the EC for financial support of this research via the MELGEN and 
ARTEMISS research projects, as well as the GESSE Topical Team and the THESEUS networking project. We also acknowledge the 
MELiSSA consortium members, the GESSE team, and the THESEUS experts for their fruitful and rewarding collaboration. 
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EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVI1Y AND PLANETARY PROTECTION. J. A. Buffington1 and N. A. Mary2, 
1 EVA Exploration Architecture Lead, EVA Management Office, NASA Parkway/FX, Houston, TX, 2EV A Explora-
tion Architecture, EVA Management Office, NASA Parkway/FX, Houston, TX 
Introduction: The first human mission to Mars 
will be the farthest distance that humans have traveled 
from Earth and the first human boots on Martian soil in 
the Exploration EVA Suit. The primary functions of 
the Exploration EVA SUit are to provide a habitable, 
anthropometric, pressurized environment for up to 
eight hours that allows crewmembers to perform au-
. tonomous and robotically assisted extravehicular ex-
ploration, science/research, construction, servicing, and 
repair operations on the exterior of the vehicle, in haz-
ardous external conditions of the Mars local environ-
ment. The Exploration EVA Suit has the capability to 
structurally interface with exploration vehicles via next 
generation ingress/egress systems. Operational con-
cepts and requirements are dependent on the mission 
profile, surface assets, and the Mars environment. This 
presentation will discuss the effects and dependencies 
of the EVA system design with the local Mars envi-
ronment and Planetary Protection. Of the three study 
areas listed for the workshop, EVA identifies most 
strongly with technology and operations for contamina-
tion control. 
Study Area 1, Microbial and Human Healtb Moni-
toring: It is assumed that most of the microbial and 
environmental monitoring related to particulates and 
backward contamination will be provided by the vehi-
cle Environmental Control and Life Support System 
(ECLSS) and external tools, such as a detection kit. 
The suit includes sensors for pressure regulation, 02 
pressure, C02, and humidity levels. Other contami-
nants such as dust would not easily get inside the suit 
during an EVA with the bladder underneath the suit 
restraints being air tight, and the suit at an ambient 
pressure greater than the Martian atmosphere. Opera-
tions such as ingress, suit maintenance, etc. have poten-
tial to result in external dust contamination also within 
the vehicle/facility, not just the suit, as discussed under 
Study Area 2. This is where technology and operations 
for contamination control fit in. 
Study Area 2, Technology and Operations for 
Contamination Control: Dust contamination and 
Planetary Protection must be treated with increased 
sensitivity on Mars. EVA is essential for exploration 
and a primary method for the efficacy of exploration 
mission success, research, and the goal of human pio-
neering. Each EVA performed on the surface of Mars 
allows dust to come into contact with the suits. Boots, 
gloves, elbows and knees will likely see the most ac-
cumulation of dust. 
Layered Engineering Defense Plan: A Layered 
Engineering Defense Plan, which includes 6 layers, 
should be utilized to help mitigate the effect of dust on 
the suit materials, the transfer of dust on the suits, for-
ward and backward contamination to the crew and hab-
itation, cleaning and protection (interior and exterior) 
and the use of air quality contamination zones. [ 1] 
The 1st layer includes materials and engineering de-
sign. Fabrication of an EVA suit with resistance to im-
pact and abrasion from the Martian dust poses a signif-
icant engineering challenge. Technology advances are 
required for the material layup for both space and plan-
et environments, and can include material exposure to 
dust, abrasion, punctures, cuts, hypervelocity impacts 
(micrometeoroids and secondary ejecta), and general 
vehicle materials compatibility without compromising 
suit mobility. · [2] Dust tolerant mechanisms, seals, 
bearings, and electrical connectors are necessary to 
prevent connector shorts, and mechanical failure of 
connector. These particulate tolerant mechanisms 
should also be maintainable so that any 
dust/dirt/particulates can be periodically cleaned out. 
Pockets and folds should be minimized such that they 
do not collect particulates and sensitive equipment 
should include dust impermeable covers. 
The 2od Layer deals with operational controls, 
which includes eliminating, to the extent possible, suit 
ingress to the habitable volumes. Among multiple rea-
sons that constitute the need to perform nominal EV As 
from habitable elements, EVA space suit components 
have a limited life duration and must be maintained 
during a long duration human mission. The space suits 
need to be brought inside a habitable volume for nomi-
nal and contingency maintenance, which will introduce 
some amount of dust. The process will be a multi-phase 
integrated operation to limit dust introduction into the 
suits and into the crew cabin. ECLSS will provide air 
circulation and revitalization for contamination and 
particulate control in the cabin. 
Operational controls also include ingress/egress 
methods that will mitigate dust transfer into the cabin, 
(i.e. rear-entry airlocks, suitport-airlocks, and suit-
ports). Past methods of ingress/egress through airlocks 
would have the crewmember traversing/translating 
directly through the dust that was brought in after an 
EVA both after the crewmembers doff their suits and 
prior to donning their suits. A next generation airlock is 
needed to provide readily available EVA capability, 
particulate mitigation, and backward and forward plan-
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etary protection by donning/doffing the rear-entry EVA 
suit through a bulkhead, such that the crewmember 
does not translate through the dust shirtsleeve during 
vehicle ingress and don/doff. To further prevent back-
ward contamination, consideration is underway to 
leave the EVA space suits behind on the surface. 
The 3rrl Layer includes contamination prevention. Ex-
ploration of Mars must be conducted with planetary 
protection requirements, considering both forward and 
backward contamination prevention. Space suits inher-
ently have some amount of venting/leakage. Human 
systems introduce the risk of forward contamination 
through venting of organics through water vapor with 
trace contaminants such as gases (CO, methane, etc.) 
and liquids (body oils, ointments, etc.) and leakage 
through flanges and fabric-to-metal attachment points. 
Some of the next generation airlock methods minimize 
the volume of consumables being vented from the ve-
hicle; however, there is still gas during depress that is 
vented to the atmosphere. Vented gas as well as gas 
contained by reclamation systems can help reduce this 
with the proper amount of filtration in place in the ve-
hicle's ECLSS. Likewise these same human systems 
introduce the risk of backward contamination to the 
crewrnembers and to the Earth and need to be evaluat-
ed by human health and performance. Despite possible 
engineered controls designed within the suit and other 
assets, operational controls for planetary protection are 
anticipated to establish "keep out zones" or special 
regions prohibiting human presence in Martian areas 
deemed to be highly likely to contain life. These zones 
would probably be established by robotic precursor 
missions to conduct sensitive analyses before an EVA 
crewrnember arrives. Flight rules and operational con-
cepts need to be understood to work around potential 
special regions. 
To the extent possible, Layers 4 and 5 are directed 
toward external and internal cleaning and will help 
minimize the amount of dust brought into a pressuriza-
ble area or ingress/egress method and minimize the 
cleaning of interior zones. Wipes (dry and wet), vacu-
um/cleaning systems and other potential cleaning tools 
that can safely remove and contain dust without ex-
ceeding the limitation of the space suit materials need 
to be evaluated. Contamination detection technology 
should be evaluated via purpose and operational con-
cepts (hand-held vs. inside the ingress/egress method). 
Containment and cleaning technology needs to be 
evaluated. If sterilization is considered necessary in the 
ingress/egress method, it must not exceed the suit ma-
terial limitations and must be compatible with the vehi-
cle ECLSS and materials inside the ingress/egres·s 
method. When ingressing the chamber containing the 
space suits to perform suit maintenance, the crewmem-
bers don Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to the 
extent necessary, along with utilizing floor mats, pres-
sure differentials, dust containment curtains, mud 
rooms, etc. 
Finally, the 6th Layer includes air quality contami-
nation zones. This is linked to engineering and opera-
tional design of the ingress/egress method as well as 
the overall asset architecture. As mentioned above, a 
conventional airlock would include a single volume for 
bringing the suit inside a pressurizeable volume for 
conducting suit maintenance. Next generation airlocks 
such as rear-entry airlocks/suitlocks and suitport-
airlocks could include a secondary chamber or mud 
room to further contain contamination and increase air 
quality as the crewmember translates to the cleanest 
areas of the vehicles, such as habitats, pressurized rov-
ers and ascent vehicles. 
Strategic Knowledge Gaps for EVA: Strategic 
Knowledge Gaps include the need for an agen-
cy/program endorsed document that includes the fol-
lowing characteristics of the environment: chemical 
and physical properties of dust/dirt, particle size, 
shape, composition, toxicity, static electricity, electri-
cal conductance, dust storms, etc. Guidance for use of 
dust simulants is needed for testing. If JSC-Mars 1 
simulant is not adequate for testing mechanical sys-
tems, what is? [3] Do certain corrosive materials need 
to be added to the simulants for materials testing? 
What are the mitigation protocols? Do the dust proper-
ties change when exposed to a habitable environment 
(pressure, humidity, increased 02, etc.)? What type of 
hazards does the dust present to humans? A program-
matic requirement for allowable levels of Martian con-
tamination within the habitable volume is needed. Next 
generation airlock analogs/testing should be demon-
strated to study levels of dust mitigation/planetary pro-
tection. 
Closure of knowledge gaps can significantly in-
crease the fidelity of early development testing of EVA 
suit materials and will help develop flight rules and 
operational concepts to enable more efficient human 
exploration of the Mars surface. 
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Introduction: Low-latency teleoperations has the 
potential to help address a number of planetary protec-
tion concerns associated with human exploration mis-
sions to Mars. Based on present conceptions of poten-
tial special regions on Mars, it may be prudent to fmd 
and explore such regions telerobotically in order to 
address contamination control concerns for those re-
gions and to mitigate potential biohazards to crew 
members and possibly to terrestrial life when crew 
members return to earth. Depending on how special 
regions are ultimately defined and understood in thej.r 
actual environments (e.g. through precursor mission 
data, modeling, etc.), and depending on what kinds of 
contamination control technologies may be imple-
mented with crew assets (such as suits, rovers, sample 
acquisition systems, drills, etc.) it may also be prudent 
to explore these regions for long periods of time with-
out humans in the immediate environment of interest. 
Similarly, if there is sufficient uncertainty about the 
biological or chemical nature of Mars samples, it may 
be wise to explore strategies for telerobotically con-
ducting sample operations for long periods of time. 
Teleoperations may also be useful for addressing other 
operations related to planetary protection such as suit 
and other asset operations (e.g. cleaning, maintenance, 
etc.) and "end oflife" mission operations. 
The Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT) 
Mars Destination Operations Team (DOT) examined 
these challenges from an integrated operational per-
spective and noted potentially significant roles for low-
latency teleoperations (LL T - used interchangeably 
with 'teleoperations' and 'telerobotics' in this ~b­
stract). The HAT Mars Moons Team is also presently 
analyzing teleoperations from Mars orbit to assess 
trades, including potential advantages and implications 
of telerobotically exploring special regions from Mars 
orbit. 
This presentation will provide background of sci-
ence operations from the HAT Mars DOT 500-day 
surface operations concept work and focus primarily, 
although not exclusively, on 3 domains of Mars opera-
tions that are potentially relevant to planetary protec-
tion and LLT: (1) Mars orbit to Mars surface, (2) Mars 
surface location to Mars special regions, and (3) Mars 
science lab teleoperations. 
Mars Orbit to Mars Surface Teleoperations: 
HAT is presently analyzing missions to the moons of 
Mars (and Mars orbit generally) prior to landing crew 
on the surface of Mars. One potential advantage of 
such missions is that orbit-to-surface teleoperations 
can be conducted with very short communication de-
lays (e.g. well under .5 seconds). This kind of low-
latency teleops can allow crew members to be highly 
responsive with surface assets on the Mars surface - a 
form of ''real-time" or "near real-time" operations. 
These surface assets could be pre-deployed (prior to 
the human mission to Mars) or could be deployed dur-
ing the human Mars orbit mission. Depending on the 
capabilities of those assets (e.g. mobility and scientific 
capabilities), it should be possible to scientifically ex-
plore fairly large areas of the surface, and possibly 
sub-surface, prior to crew landing on the surface. This 
could allow for previously unknown special regions to 
be found and for special regions in general to be direct-
ly explored thoroughly before crew lands on the sur-
face. In this way, orbit-to-surface teleops can also 
potentially inform crew landing site selection. 
Depending on what is learned about contaminant 
transport and contaminant impacts to sites of interest, a 
crewed surface landing may compromise planetary 
protection protocols. Crew operations of surface assets 
from Mars orbit would avoid this concern - as long as 
the telerobotic surface assets were properly cleaned 
and maintained. An outstanding question is the size of 
the area (including subsurface) that reconnaissance 
should cover and the kinds of analysis needed over that 
area prior to crew landing. 
Drilling. Related to the above question, it may be 
preferable to drill for various reasons - ranging from 
resource prospecting to biohazard detection to the 
search for life. If drilling turns out to important, it will 
be one of the more challenging tasks and so will be an 
area of focus for this presentation. It may prudent to 
conduct drilling without having to put humans in the 
immediate drill zone, at least initially, if not for longer 
durations while sensitive drilling activities are being 
conducted. The following paragraphs are taken from a 
HAT drilling report on Mars drilling associated with 
human missions [2]: 
A fully automated and/or telerobotic drilling sys-
tem, with no hands-on human interaction, could meet 
planetary protection constraints but may not be practi-
cal, particularly for deep drilling operations which of-
ten require hands-on trouble-shooting. Depending on 
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the type of drilling technology selected, automation or 
telerobotic control could drive the need for specialized 
equipment manipulators, which in turn would require 
additional power and thermal conditioning. Adding to 
the complexity, subsurface sample collection and re-
turn to a Science Lab would also have to be fully au-
tomated or telerobotic. 
A workshop on Planetary Drilling and Sample Ac-
quisition held at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter in May, 2013 noted significant technology gaps to 
overcome: "Automated core acquisition and handling, 
rugged and high-temperature sensor development and 
placement, automated drilling control software, and 
software testing and validation are technology gaps." 
The HAT drilling report built on this and made further 
recommendations: 
Recommendation: If deep drilling operations must 
be autonomous and/or telerobotic due to planetary pro-
tection concerns, technology development emphasis 
should be placed on automated core and fluid acquisi-
tion and handling, low mass borehole stabilization, 
rugged and high-temperature sensor development and 
placement, automated drilling control software, and 
software testing and validation. 
Recommendation: If deep drilling operations must 
be completely autonomous and/or telerobotic, a high 
fidelity mass and operational timeline analysis should 
be completed to determine whether it makes more 
sense to perform this activity on a crewed vs. robotic 
mission. Some of this analysis is underway and will be 
covered in the presentation. 
Recommendation: Mass should be allocated for au-
tomated and/or telerobotic control for deep drilling 
systems (including power). 
The time-scale for a drill to encounter difficulties is 
often on the order of 1 0 to 20 seconds, making tele-
operation from Earth risky. Teleoperation from Mars 
orbit or Mars surface is feasible, but risk will vary with 
drill design and drilling conditions. 
Mars Surface Location to Mars Special Regions: 
Much of what is conducted from Mars orbit via LLT 
could also be performed once the crew has landed on 
the surface. There is the additional potential advantage 
that for many scenarios the latency will be lower and 
potentially less complicated since surface assets may 
be closer and in direct line of sight at most (or all) 
times. The HAT Mars Destination Operations Team 
developed an integrated long-duration 500 day "sci-
ence-driven" surface operations concept in which low-
latency teloeperations was invoked as a possible strat-
egy for exploring potential special regions while the 
crew is on the Martian surface at a safe distance from 
special regions. The team reviewed past literature and 
had invited presentations on planetary protection and 
contamination control. It was suggested that if the 
surface assets can be maintained to meet planetary 
protection protocols, then such assets could be tele-
operated to safely explore potential special regions. It 
may also be that during the initial period of crew ac-
climation after the crew has landed, that LLT can be 
conducted from the habitat into the surrounding land-
ing area in order to gain additional detailed under-
standing of the landing area environment before crew 
performs the first EV As or other operations that may 
be problematic for contamination reasons. 
Mars Surface Science Lab Teleoperations: It is 
also possible that the crew (either from orbit or from a 
surface location such as a habitat or pressurized rover), 
using telerobotic assets that are on the surface, could 
efficiently acquire samples and transport them to a pre-
deployed science laboratory to conduct additional de-
tailed analysis on the samples as needed. This addi-
tional analysis could be done via low-latency teleoper-
ations of laboratory assets and would benefit from 
high-precision manipulators and advanced scientific 
instruments. Similarly, once the crew has landed, a 
similar strategy can be used when the crew is on the 
surface since this will allow samples to be relatively 
isolated from other surface assets and their associated 
operations (e.g. such as crew habitats). 
Additional Considerations: Cleaning and mainte-
nance of surface assets such as suits and rovers is like-
ly to be a key operational activity. Telerobotics has the 
potential to provide an effective way to safely perform 
complex tasks of this kind without exposing the crew 
directly to Mars material or vice-versa. It may also be 
worth considering potential "end of mission" concerns 
and the associated operational details such as disas-
sembly applications or "seal up" operatic:ns (e.g. hab, 
rovers, etc.) that may be best done telerobotically ei-
ther when crew on the surface or from Mars orbit be-
fore the crew leaves the Mars system. Disposing of the 
Mars ascent vehicle (MA V) could be a unique chal-
lenge because impacting it somewhere could release 
contaminants. The MA V could be teleoperated to a 
state that meets planetary protection requirements (e.g. 
venting down to vacuum to try to kill organisms, 
transport to, and/or orientation in, a safe in-space loca-
tion, or possibly a "controlled" landing to a safe zone if 
needed). 
References: [I] Bobskill, M. and Lupisella, M. L. 
(20 14) Human Mars Science Surface Operations. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
Presented at SpaceOps 2014, Pasadena, CA. 
[2] Rucker, M. et al. (2013) Drilling System Study, 
Mars Architecture Design Reference Architecture 5.0. 
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Introduction: At our current vantage point, two 
major potential enterprises lie in the future: Mars sam-
ple return (MSR), and human exploration of Mars. 
Although many significant planetary protection-related 
knowledge gaps are associated with the latter, there is 
significant overlap in the type of research that would 
help address current planetary protection knowledge 
gaps for both lines of discovery. It is therefore im-
portant that these overlaps are identified early, so that 
information that addresses these knowledge gaps is 
shared in order to minimize duplicating effort and 
maximize achievement of common goals. In these are-
as, the expected accomplishments of potential sample 
return would not need to be separately planned and 
budgeted for in association with a human mission. In 
this paper, we plan to introduce for discussion two 
topics where information from MSR could clearly feed 
forward into human extraterrestrial missions, and one 
topic where the path to sharing information is less clear 
(and perhaps not possible). 
Figure 1. General overview of the feed forward of 
knowledge from Mars sample return to human ex~ 
traterrestrial missions. 
Areas of Overlap: There are at least two general 
aspects of planetary protection planning and imple-
mentation strategy related to the multiple possible mis-
sions of the MSR campaign that would benefit human 
exploration: 
1. Detailed analysis of martian surface materials. 
2. Technological advances in cleaning and con-
. tamination control. 
Martian surface material analysis: The primary 
planetary protection question that could be addressed 
by potential MSR analyses would be results of investi-
gation into the potential for past or present life on 
Mars. In addition, returned samples could also provide 
detailed information about the physical, chemical, and 
electrical properties of the martian regolith - strategic 
knowledge gaps which were acknowledged in the 2012 
P-SAG fmal report [1]. In that report, knowledge gaps 
were considered with respect to the direct effects on 
astronauts for a human mission. However, they are 
also relevant specifically to planetary protection in that 
they provide the detailed information needed to make 
specifications for meeting requirements pertaining to 
cleaning, sterilizing and preventing re-contamination 
in surface habitat environments. 
Questions addressed: If no martian life is detected 
in returned samples, but human extraterrestrial mis-
sions explore a different location on Mars, what envi-
ronmental information/rom returned samples could be 
useful to minimizing human impacts in the explored 
location? How can information about returned mar-
tian regolith be used to study the effect of dust on seals 
designed to minimize contamination? 
Technological advances: The second area of over-
lap between MSR and human extraterrestrial missions 
would be in the technological advances developed for 
controlled recovery and analysis of the returned mar-
tian samples. These technical advances could then be 
used for developing in-situ cleaning and sterilization 
protocols for nominal surface operations of a human 
mission, or for back up clean-up protocols in the event 
of an inadvertent release of terrestrial material, among 
other applications. If considerations for the type of 
developments needed for human exploration were out-
lined within the MSR timeline, these technological 
developments could be broadened to meet both needs. 
Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions (2015) 
Questions addressed: How can methods designed 
for and tested on returned samples be used to design 
effective cleaning methods for nominal operations dur-
ing human exploration? How can studies into clean-up 
of the location where the potential returned sample 
container would impact Earth 's surface, combined 
with information about physical properties of returned 
martian regolith, be used to design environmental 
clean-up protocols for Mars suiface operations? 
In addition to feeding into general operations of 
any· future human extraterrestrial missions, information 
from Mars sample return could also inform decisions 
that were made as to the type of science investigations 
that future astronauts could perform without risk of 
contamination of the martian surface or risk to them-
selves. 
Break-the-chain: Although breaking the chain of 
contact with Mars for sample return is a familiar, 
though complicated, problem, for human exploration 
of Mars there may conceivably be no way to break the 
chain of contact if an astronaut becomes part of the 
"chain." Although Mars sample return technologies 
can help minimize the chances that this scenario would 
occur, if it did, the type of break-the-chain architecture 
developed for MSR may not be applicable to human 
missions. 
Questions addressed: Is peifect separation between 
the martian surface environment and human suiface 
habitats possible? Are there break-the-chain options 
that exist or could be explored for human exploration? 
Conclusions: Although there are certainly areas of 
overlap between Mars sample return and human extra-
terrestrial missions where data addressing knowledge 
gaps from the former could be fed forward into similar 
knowledge gaps in the later, many of these focus on 
human health factors and questions of design of sur-
face habitats and mobility systems. When considering 
the overlaps that are of concern to planetary protection, 
although there are fewer, some of the remaining ques-
tions can only be answered by sample return. Although 
feed-forward of information from Mars sample return 
could be of significant value to human exploration, in 
order to most efficiently use the very valuable resource 
of returned samples, the planetary protection investiga-
tions undertaken must be carefully planned well in 
advance. 
References: [1] Beaty D. W. and Carr M. H. 
(2012), posted at http://mepagjpl.na.Sa.gov/reportsl. 
1020.pdf 
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Introduction: The ability to extract and process 
resources at the site of exploration into products and 
services, commonly referred to as In Situ Resource 
Utilization (ISRU), can have significant benefits for 
robotic and human exploration missions. In particular, 
the ability to use in situ resources to make propellants, 
fuel cell reactants, and life support consumables has 
been shown in studies to significantly reduce mission 
mass, cost, and risk, while enhancing or enabling mis-
sions not possible without the incorporation of ISRU. 
In December 2007, NASA completed the Mars Human 
Design Reference Architecture (DRA) 5.0 study [1]. 
For the first time in a large scale Mars architecture 
study, water from Mars soil was considered as a poten-
tial resource. At the time of the study, knowledge of 
water resources (their form, concentration, and distri-
bution) was extremely limited. Also, due to lack of 
understanding of how to apply planetary protection 
rules and requirements to ISRU soil-based excavation 
and processing, an extremely conservative approach 
was incorporated where only the top several centime-
ters of ultraviolet (UV) radiated soil could be pro-
cessed (assumed to be 3% water by mass). While re-
sults of the Mars DRA 5.0 study showed that combin-
ing atmosphere processing to make oxygen and me-
thane with soil processing to extract water provided the 
lowest mission mass, atmosphere processing to convert 
carbon dioxide (C02) into oxygen was baselined for 
the mission since it was the lowest power and risk op-
tion [2]. With increased knowledge and further clarifi-
cation of Mars planetary protection rules, and the re-
cent release of the Mars Exploration Program Analysis 
Group (MEPAG) report on "Special Regions and the 
Human Exploration of Mars" [3], it is time to reex-
amine potential water resources on Mars, options for 
soil processing to extract water, and the implications 
with respect to planetary protection and Special Re-
gions on Mars. 
Potential Water Resources for ISRU: The con-
centration, form, depth, and distribution of water re-
sources on Mars varies greatly as a function of latitude 
and geological features . At the equatorial region (be-
tween 30°S and 30°N), areas of enhanced water from 
Mars Odyssey neutron analysis are usually interpreted 
as being due to hydrated minerals. These minerals can 
contain water at extremely low concentrations <2% to 
as much as 13% by mass. At the mid latitudes (30° to 
60°) subsurface ice/permafrost may exist in the top 5 
meters and fresh impacts have exposed ice excavated 
from 0.3-2.0 meters in depth. At higher latitudes, ice 
exists at higher concentrations and closer to the sur-
face, but are seasonally covered with C02 ice in the 
winter. Soil excavated by the Phoenix lander descent 
and landing rocket plume and the robotic excavator 
arm showed dirty near-pure ice near the surface. Two 
other forms/location of water on Mars have been postu-
lated but not yet proven; subterranean aquifers and 
briny water in Recurring Slope Lineae (RSL) . Since 
both of these potential forms of water are considered 
Special Regions, they have been excluded for consid-
eration as resources for ISRU extraction operations. 
Both hydrated minerals and icy soils are considered 
viable resources for ISRU extraction operations. 
Excavation and Soil Processing Techniques for 
Water Extraction: Two general approaches to extract 
water from Martian soil have been considered: remove 
the water in situ from the soil, and excavate and trans-
fer the soil to a heating chamber that can be enclosed 
so that water released can be removed and collected. 
To remove the water in situ , the surface of the soil 
to be processed needs to be covered with a collection 
dome and the soil heated directly. Two concepts have 
been proposed to heat the soil directly; 1) via solar 
heating through a greenhouse-like transparent dome 
and 2) via microwave energy. Once the soil is heated, 
water is released in the form of vapor and is collected 
in a cold trap. Due to the low heating rate from solar 
energy, the rate at which water is evolved will be low. 
Also, because of the significant potential for the water 
vapor to recondense in the soil or other locations than 
the cold trap, no significant work has been performed 
to advance this method of water extraction. Experi-
mental work has been performed using microwaves to 
extract water from ice in lunar regolith simulants that 
shows promise [ 4]. Because microwave energy can be 
concentrated, the collection dome can be much smaller. 
To promote the evolution of water, it has also been 
proposed to drill holes into the soil before heating to 
provide a path for water vapor migration to the cold 
trap. While this approach for in situ water extraction 
will be much more efficient than solar heating, there is 
still the potential for water vapor condensation back 
into the soil at the border between heated and non-
heated soil thereby reducing extraction efficiency. 
To excavate Mars soil for subsequent processing, 
the technique chosen will have to consider the soil and 
form of water present (hydration vs icy) and the com-
pactness/hardness of the soil. For hydrated soils or 
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soils with low concentrations of ice, traditional excava-
tion methods such as the lift-haul-dump or buck-
etwheellbucketdrum concept may be favored. As ice 
concentration increases, along with material hardness, 
vibratory blades or augers to break up and move the 
material may be required. Once the material has been 
excavated, it can then be transferred to a heating cham-
ber. Three heating methods have been considered for 
soil processing; 1) electrical heaters/conduction, 2) 
fluidization/convection, and 3) microwave heating. 
Significant work has been performed over the last 10 
years on the first two heating methods for hydrogen 
reduction of lunar regolith, lunar ice prospecting, and 
Mars ~oil drying [5]. To remove all the water from 
hydrated soils typically requires the soil to be heated to 
above 600°C. However, based on data from the Sam-
ple Analysis on Mars (SAM) instrument on the Curi-
osity rover, a heating limit of <450°C may be desired 
to mitigate the production of HCl and H2S contami-
nates released as carbonates and perchlorates in the soil 
breakdown as temperature increases [6]. A significant 
fraction of the water (~80%) is released below 450°C. 
Laboratory tests suggest heating times of 30 to 60 
minutes may be required. For removal of water from 
icy soils, the heating temperature is expected to be 
<300°C. An interesting concept that combined using 
an auger to excavate material and an enclosure cap to 
heat the soil while still on the auger blades was de-
signed and built by Honeybee Robotics, called the Mo-
bile In Situ Moon/Mars Water Extractor (MISME). 
The MISME concept demonstrated that significant 
amounts of water could be obtained from icy soils with 
minimal hardware and energy [7]. Once the soil is 
processed, it will be removed from the heating chamber 
and dumped back on the ground; either immediately or 
delivered to a designated site. 
Soil-based ISRU and Planetary Protection: Any 
soil-based ISRU process on Mars needs to ensure that 
i) there is no Forward Contamination from the hard-
ware utilized, and .ii) no Special Region is created 
based on the excavation and processing of soil contain-
ing water. To ensure no forward contamination occurs, 
the ISRU excavation and soil processing hardware will 
be sterilized to Viking mission standards before launch. 
This is not considered to be a significant design issue 
for the soil heating chamber since sustained operating 
temperatures of up to 450°C are expected. COSPAR 
defines ~al ASdions ~ "a r5dion within which 
ta-re&rial orgt11iS11S Cl'e likely to r~iccte" a'ld &aes 
tha ' ' CllY r5di on which is i nterpretoo to het.'e a high 
potf!ltial for the e<:i&ence of extt11t MCI'tiCil life forms 
isaloo definoo ~aSpocial A5dion" [8]. It isthereiore 
i mportCilt for I SA.U prOCEH> not to all ow wcta- in M Cl'· 
ti t11 ooi I to rerna n in a I i quid &ate for t11 exter'£100 pe-
riod of time. The duration of this time is TBD Clld will 
nero to be ~reed upon with the PIC119:CI)' Protoction 
community. Tha-efore, ooi I procea:j to extra:;t w<t.a-
may be r91uiroo to be cooloo be ow the freezing point 
before dis::ading bc:d< to ttie SJrfa::e. Pr<>Ce!Bng dur& 
tions may alro be i~ on 111Eihods asoocicioo with 
in situ hooting of theMCJ"sroil ~wei. 
Conclusion: The processing of the soil on Mars to 
extract water for subsequent use in making propellants, 
fuel cell reactants, and life support consumables is en-
abling for future human exploration of Mars. The pro-
cessing of Martian soil to extract the water present 
raises both Forward Contamination and creation of 
Special Region issues that will need to be addressed 
before operations can begin. At this time, it is believed 
that the currently proposed Mars soil-based ISRU con-
cepts will be able to mitigate both of these planetary 
protection concerns. 
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Introduction: The issue of drill bits or other sam-
pling mechanisms penetrating a subsurface Special 
Region is a current sampling technology gap in plane-
tary protection. Our concept is to develop and test a 
new method of subsystem sterilization (bit steriliza-
tion) compatible with sample retrieval and transfer to 
in-situ spacecraft instruments or for sample return 
caching. With the drill bit's internal-heater self-
sterilizing capability, this concept also tackles how we 
could recover during a mission if an accidental con-
tamination does occur. 
With this advance in planetary protection technolo-
gies and practices, the accidental contamination of a 
drill during sample transfer (or wind-blown particles 
off a spacecraft deck, or other vectors) would not nec-
essarily mean a difficult choice between end-of-
mission or else introducing potential contaminants into 
a Special Region. 
Background: Our team have also participated in a 
Discovery-class mission proposal, called "Icebreaker", 
(Figure 1) which is a Phoenix-derived Mars polar 
lander with life and organics detection instruments and 
a 1 m sampling drill (McKay 2013). As a solar system 
exploration mission, the Icebreaker mission must com-
ply with the Planetary Protection requirements estab-
lished by NASA policy NPD 8020.7G and detailed in 
NPR 8020.12D, "Planetary Protection Provisions for 
Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions."[!]. 
The Phoenix mission to Mars· was considered a 
Category IV c mission because the arm on the lander 
accessed a Special Region - the subsurface ice. As a 
result the arm was sterilized to the IV c requirements 
Figure 1. Concept of"lcebreaker" Phoenix-derived polar 
drilling lander 
[2,3] and the rest of the spacecraft was cleaned to IVa 
requirements. To ensure that the arm remained steril-
ized the arm was encased in a biobarrier cocoon [2] 
during assembly and deployed from the cocoon (with 
some difficulty) on Mars. 
Mars polar drilling and sampling missions (like 
Icebreaker) will access the subsurface ice. If this ice is 
still considered a Special Region, the planetary protec-
tion requirements for Icebreaker will be the same as for 
Phoenix. 
1. The main part of the spacecraft will need to 
satisfy Category IV a cleanliness. 
2. The drill and any portions of the spacecraft 
that could come in contact with the ice in the 
subsurface will need to satisfy Category IVc 
requirements. 
- sterilization 
- biobarrier containment 
- non-contact with unsterilized lander compo-
nents during operations 
Current practice for sterilization for Planetary Pro-
tection purposes uses dry heat microbial reduction 
(DHMR). This is a NASA certified process [4, 1] 
which involves temperatures in the range of 1 04 to 
125°C with controlled absolute humidity, for durations 
that depend on the temperature. Barengo1tz [5] points 
out that DHMR may be used without any assay and 
with the surface spore burden density specifications, 
or with a prior assay to establish a lower pretreatment 
density. Biobarrier containment was a significant chal-
lenge for the Phoenix arm [2] and will be a challenge 
for the Icebreaker drill. Any sample handling subsys-
tem that is in contact with the drill will also have to be 
included within a biobarrier. On Mars, the drill as-
sembly will have to emerge from the biobarrier to 
commence operations. 
Approach: Automated sample delivery while 
breaking the chain of contact (maintaining ster-
ile/nonsterile separations from a drill) is an unresolved 
technology gap that must be addressed before astrobi-
ology missions can penetrate Category IVc (Special 
Region) areas. Our drilling planetary protection con-
cept proposes to develop prototypes and test two as-
pects of planetary protection of the subsurface: a ro-
botic system for retrieving and conveying drill or 
scoop samples to instruments, without drill contact; 
and a new planetary-protection technology: an em-
bedded heat-sterilization inductive heating loop inside 
the drill bit, capable of re-sterilizing the drill in case of 
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unplanned or inadvertent contact with the sample han-
dling system (or other sources of contaminants). Of 
interest for study are the microbial counts before and 
after sterilization protocols, allowing for iterative im-
proving of protocols and designs based on the con-
taminant reduction performance of these two ap-
proaches. 
Our conceptual approach is to reduce spore counts 
by heating the drill in-situ. While a few minutes of 
high surface temperatures is not equivalent to Viking-
standard long-duration/modest-temperature baking 
(- l20°C x 24-48 hours), it will still reduce and allevi-
ate spore counts blown over or from inadvertent con-
tact with a "dirty" spacecraft. 
In terrestrial exploratory drilling where bio-cross-
contarnination is an issue, current practice after sample 
acquisition is to clean and then reduce the bio-load of 
the drill end before re-insertion into a borehole. Under 
field conditions on Earth, this is typically done to ex-
ploration drills by using strong solvents and/or by 
dousing the drill string in alcohol and setting it on fire 
briefly. Heating would occur outside the borehole, and 
the drill string would then be expected to loiter after a 
heat-disinfection cycle sufficient to return to surface 
ambient temperatures prior to reinsertion. 
As a side benefit, in an emergency an embedded bit 
heater could reduce mission-Joss risks significantly --
by providing a means of freeing a drill string frozen 
stuck in an ice layer. And the bit-end temperature sen-
sor could also be used for downhole heat-flow meas-
urements. Starting with just an initial concept here, it 
would be possible to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
an embedded heater in a drill bit by integrating com-
mercial off the shelf (COTS) components with existing 
(Icebreaker) or new drill hardware. In the design ex-
ample shown in Figure 2, a 28.6 rom (1.125 inch) di-
ameter COTS drill bit is shown with a 200 W and 
871 °C ( 1600°F) capable COTS Cartridge Heater with 
internal type K thermocouple. The COTS drill bit and 
heater/thermocouple combo are shown integrated with 
an existing auger design. 
While there is a significant spacecraft power draw 
Cartndge Heal~:< "''" type K thermocouple 
Tungslen COTS dr~l Btl St;o•nle~~ Hol<>w Tv~ 
Augor 
Figure 2. Location of Cartridge Heater in Ice-
breaker-Compatible Drill Bit. 
for a bit heater, it would be only about 2-3 times the 
load of normal drilling operation levels (70-1 00 W), 
and heated periods are expected to be much shorter 
than the time spent drilling. This fits within expected 
spacecraft drilling power budgets. If it proves to be an 
effective in situ sterilization approach, it could con-
ceivably reduce or eliminate the need for 
DMHR/biobarrier for the bit assembly. 
Technology Objectives arid Maturity Goals: 
Two key goals of this project will be to ( 1) assess the 
effectiveness of the heated drill bit to sterilize the exte-
rior surface of the drill prior to penetrating the subsur-
face, and (2) to characterize the extent that drill cut-
tings and subsurface dusts might contaminate the drill 
rig, payloads, and local terrain. The 1st goal is to pre-
vent the forward contamination of the subsurface, and 
the z nd goal is to prevent the back contamination of the 
drill rig and terrain. We will seek to improve the 
readiness of planetary protection and contamination 
management technologies, demonstrated in both Mars 
chamber environments and analog-site field tests. Field 
tests are necessary to provide confidence in robustness, 
force system stand-alone integration, and to discover 
any unanticipated design flaws that were masked by 
the constraints of small test chamber sample targets. 
Conclusion: A new sample acquisition planetary 
protection concept offers promise through the devel-
opment and testing of a new method of subsystem ster-
ilization (embedded bit heater) compatible with sub-
surface sample acquisition and transfer. 
References: [I] NASA Procedural Directive 
8020.12D (2011). [2] Salinas et al. (2007) IEEE Aero-
space Conf. (3] Bonitz et al. (2008) J. Geophys 
Res., 113. [4] J. Barengoltz and J. Witte (2008) Ad-
vances in Space Research, 42. [5] J. Barengoltz (2005) 
IEEE Aerospace Conf 
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Title: Case Study of Human Flora and Spore Contamination 
Staying ahead of the curve In regard to Environmental Monitoring requires an understanding and an anticipation of 
the constantly changing microbial climate of the pharmaceutical manufacturing process. Knowing the characteristics of 
the environments in that process provides the benefit of allowing us to predict and solve potential future microbial 
control issues. This session will discuss pathways to use the data obtained from environmental monitoring to provide 
proactive and practical solutions for comprehending and managing everyday pharmaceutical microbiology 
challenges. This presentation will cover case studies on human flora and spore contamination in cleanroom operations. 
Solutions will be discussed to proactively present future contamination issues. 
The seminar will cover the most common causes of contamination: operators, items brought into the cleanroom, and 
degradation of the cleanroom over time. Case studies in operator borne contamination will be discussed as well as 
preventative long term solutions. Specific examples of aerobic and anaerobic vegetative bacteria will be 
highlighted and analyzed. Items brought into cleanrooms that can harbor fungal and bacterial spores will be 
discussed as well as specific case studies highlighting examples where sources were items brought into the cleanroom 
or in some cases other common causes. Fungal and bacterial spore structures as well as efficacy testing and specific 
test conditions will be briefly discussed. Solutions will be presented to prevent efficacy testing failures due to test 
method, recovery, and coupon porosity issues. Targeted long term solutions will be discussed regarding the spore 
case studies in a concerted effort to limit reoccurrences. 
The overall objective and scope of this seminar will be to discuss specific cases studies that have occurred in my years 
of experience in the industry. Specific and precision long term solutions will be conveyed to prevent reoccurrences 
and yield higher levels of control in the cleanroom operations. 
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SAMPLE CONTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY FOR MARS SAMPLE RETURN. Bob Gershman, JPL, 4800 
Oak Grove Drive, M.S. 321-520, Pasadena, CA 91109. robert.gershman@jpl.nasa.gov. 
The U.S. National Research Council and its European coun-
terpart have considered the possible risks to the Earth's bio-
sphere represented by potential Mars sample return (MSR). 
They recommended that "Samples returned from Mars by 
spacecraft should be contained and treated as though poten-
tially hazardous until proven otherwise." NASA procedural 
requirements (NPR 8020.12) specify that the mission and the 
spacecraft design shall provide a method to "break the chain 
of contact" with Mars. All Mars material delivered to Earth 
must be inside a robustly sealed container, and no uncon-
tained hardware that contacted Mars may be returned to 
Earth unless sterilized. The NASA Planetary Protection Of-
ficer has provided a draft "containment assurance" require-
ment for the first conceptual MSR mission; <10"6 probability 
of inadvertent release of a single unsterilized Mars particle to 
the Earth's biosphere. 
This talk will describe technology NASA is developing to 
meet the likely containment assurance requirement for the 
potential robotic MSR campaign. This includes methods for 
sealing the sample container with extremely low probability 
of external contamination, either on the Mars surface or in 
Mars orbit, and methods for sterilizing any residual contami-
nation. Sealing modalities being investigated include braz-
ing, explosive welding, bagging, and conventional a-rings. 
Sterilization modalities include heat, pyrotechnic paint, 
plasma, and hydrogen peroxide; but it should be noted that 
NASA has not yet considered which of these - if any - could 
be certified for sterilizing Mars material. Also, technology is 
needed to assure (with an unprecedented degree of confi-
dence) that the Earth entry vehicle would withstand the 
thermal and structural rigors of Earth atmosphere entry and 
that the sample container and its seals would survive Earth 
entry, descent, and landing. Concepts for a new Earth entry 
vehicle that could satisfy the stringent MSR reliability re-
quirements have been under study for several years, includ-
ing some preliminary technology development activities. 
1021.pdf 
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UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS AND DRIVERS FOR DEVELOPING HUMAN EXPLORATION 
PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. M. A. Jones1, D. W. Beat;?, and L. E. Hays2, 
1Biotechnology and Planetary Protection Group, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pas-
adena, CA 91109 (melissa.a.jones@jpl.nasa.gov), 1Mars Program Office, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California In-
stitute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91109. 
Introduction: The Planetary Protection Subcom-
mittee of the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) recog-
nized and recommended in May 2012 that a NASA 
Procedural Requirement should be developed to handle 
planetary protection requirements specific to proposed 
future human missions as a parallel document to 
8020.12, Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic 
Extraterrestrial Missions [1] under NASA Policy Di-
rective 8020.7, Biological Contamination Control for 
Outbound and Inbound Planetary Spacecraft [2]. Be-
tween May 2012 and March 2013 the full NAC en-
dorsed the recommendation and the NASA Adminis-
trator subsequently agreed [3]. However, the fact re-
mains that there is insufficient knowledge in both sci-
entific and technological domains to be able to set de-
tailed planetaery protection requirements to the level 
that has been done for robotic missions in 8020.12. 
Therefore, NASA Policy Instruction (NPI) 8020.7, 
NASA Policy on Planetary Protection Requirements 
for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, was developed, 
which describes general policy guidelines and ap-
proaches as a placeholder until enough information is 
determined to generate a full requirements document 
(NPR) [3]. COSPAR also amended its original 2002 
policy regarding proposed future human exploration of 
Mars, most recently in 2011; NASA missions are re-
quired to be consistent with this policy [3]. 
Getting to requirements: Fundamentally, re-
quirements must be rooted in policy but also consider 
the current state of affairs on the target body as well as 
engineering realities. An approach to developing 
planetary protection requirements for human explora-
tion would be to take a "systems view" approach to try 
to ensure all necessary requirements are accounted for 
across the "system." Those requirments can be flowed 
down through the required levels with an outcome of 
clearly implementable requirements to be met by the 
science and engineering team on the mission. This 
approach of using a typical systems engineering pro-
cess for flow down of planetary protection require-
ments has been implemented recently on an upcoming 
Mars robotic mission with resounding success so far, 
and there are plans to take a similar approach on other 
missions. Therefore, it makes sense to advocate for 
utilization of a similar "systems view" approach for the 
development of planetary protection requirements for 
future human exploration. 
In order to advance to actually developing require-
ments, it is often valuable to take key drivers into ac-
count, whether it be requirement drivers or process 
drivers. The paragraphs below describe some of the 
potential drivers that should be recoginized and dis-
cussed while addressing planetary protection require-
ments development for human missions. 
Potential policy changes: According to the 
COSP AR Policy and Guidelines for Human Missions 
as denoted in Attachment A ofNPI 8020.7, "The intent 
of planetary protection policy is the same whether a 
mission to Mars is conducted robotically or with hu-
man explorers. Accordingly, planetary protection goals 
should not be relaxed to accommodate a human mis-
sion to Mars. Rather they become even more directly 
relevant to such missions - even if specific implemen-
tation requirements must differ" [3 ]. The intent of the 
policy- the protection and preservation of the body 
being investigated as well as our home planet- is not 
likely to be arguably different between a robotic or 
human mission. However, has the feasibility of imple-
menting similar robotic contamination requirements on 
a human mission been investigated in at least a bound-
ing case format to fully understand the drivers? What 
are the limits of implementation for future proposed 
human missions versus robotic missions, potentially 
including resources? Is there potential that human ex-
ploration-related policy might drive changes to the 
robotic policy? For example, could there be changes in 
the level of contamination allowed, perhaps in specific 
areas of Mars? Would this level of investigation point 
to other noteworthy knowledge gaps? 
Knowledge development: NPI 8020.7, Section 4, 
describes a set of study areas that are critical to obtain 
the information to proceed forward on developing re-
quirements for human missions, with community input 
being sought for additional areas. The driver in this 
area is likely to be those items related to understanding 
environmental processes on Mars and other bodies. 
While modeling capabilities have gotten better over 
time, scientist still depend on data from the body itself 
to understand and validate modeling efforts. To date, it 
has taken several decades of multiple Mars missions to 
get to where we are today, and perhaps (arguably) 
there is still a lot to learn to be able to understand even 
"transport and sterilization of organism released by 
human activity" on Mars [3]. How much data would 
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need to be collected from any notional human landing 
site, and how much needs to be collected from Mars in 
general? Data from the actual landing site is perhaps 
the best, but this would require making a final selec-
tion of a landing site 1-2 decades in advance of the 
launch. Therefore, a critical driver in developing poli-
cy, in particular requirements, may be determining 
what missions and experiments are necessarily per-
formed at the target body, which may take many mis-
sion and decades to complete. This could place a lot of 
activity on the critical path that must be addressed by 
robotic precursors leading up to a future human mis-
sion. In addition, there is the question of what policy 
guidelines might need to be in place if we do not get 
the answers deemed necessary to proceed with a future 
human mission. 
A roadmap for the path forward: NPI 8020.7, 
establishes the policy guidelines and describes the ap-
proach for obtaining the information needed over the 
"next few years" to draft an equivalent NPR for human 
missions [3], which includes a "path forward" section 
outlining the roadmap through which the NPR will be 
developed. It seems advantaegous and even critical 
that the process is started now, so that the requirements 
are ready when needed. However, given that there arc 
likely to be several critical path items and schedule 
drivers (e.g., robotic precursor missions, required pro-
cess steps, technology development needs), it might be 
a useful exercise to work the time problem backwards, 
given more resolved understanding of critical inputs 
and a given target goal date, to determine feasibility of 
developing a implementable set of requirements in an 
NPR in the next few years. It may emphasize schedule 
drivers, such as places where processes and technology 
development may be useful to prove out or develop on 
precursor missions (e.g., could the proposed Asteroid 
Redirect Robotic Mission be a "proving ground" for 
future humans to Mars missions?) and where develop-
ment of some specific sections of the NPR may be well 
ahead or potentially lag behind, for some particular 
reason. 
Conclusions: While work has begun to develop the 
necessary planetary protection requirements for pro-
posed future human space exploration, particularly for 
Mars, through · COSP AR policy ammendrnents, rec-
ommendations by the Planetary Protection Subcommit-
tee, and development ofNPI 8020.7, it is beneficial to 
take a systematic end-to-end approach ("system view") 
to determine the best path forward for planetary pro-
tection requirements development for future human 
missions. It is critical to determine as early as possible 
the driving factors (including some potential ones dis-
cussed above), and answer question about them as 
quantatively as possible for development of the process 
as well as the actual requirements. The advantage is 
that this would typically ensure a robust, stakeholder-
supported process for developing a clear and imple-
mentable NPR detailing planetary protection require-
ments for proposed future human exploration. 
References: [1] NPR 8020.120, Planetary Protec-
tion Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions 
(See NASA NODIS Library for current document). 
[2] NPD 8020.70, Biological Contamination Control 
for Outbound and Inbound Planetary Spacecraft (See 
NASA NODIS Library for current document). [3] NPI 
8020.7, NASA Policy on Planetary Protection Re-
quirements for Human Extraterrestrial Missions (Sec 
NASA NO DIS Library for current document). 
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FORWARD PLANETARY PROTECTION ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO PLANNING 
FOR THE POTENTIAL HUMAN EXPLORATION OF MARS. D. W. Beaty1, R M. Davis2, V. E. Hamilton3, 
L. E. Hays1, M.A. Jones1, D. S. S. Lim4•5, J.D. Rummel6, and R. Wbitley7• 1Mars Program Office, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91109 (dwbeaty@jpl.nasa.gov), 2NASA HQ, Wash-
ington, DC, 3NASA Ames Research Center, Mountain View, CA 94035, 4BAER Institute, Petaluma, CA 94043; 
6East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858, 7NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 77058. 
Introduction: A human mission to the martian sur-
face would potentially constitute a large biological 
contamination event for at least one location on Mars, 
and depending on the design of the mission, possibly 
more than one. In order for such a mission to be ac-
complished in an acceptable manner, the planetary sci-· 
ence community needs to debate and consider the best 
answers to the following broad questions: 
1) How can a human mission to Mars limit its 
potential contamination of the planet? 
2) Where are the places on Mars where a large 
biological contamination event would be ac-
ceptable, if it were to occur? 
3) Would a human mission entail a lifting, ei-
ther partially or entirely, of the restrictions on 
the biologicill contamination of Mars? 
At the present time, a primary driver behind the re-
strictions on "forward" contamination is that the explo-
ration of Mars is in an active phase of the search for 
evidence of indigenous life (both past and present). As 
we look ahead to a possible human exploration pro-
gram focused on Mars, there are three logical ways the 
future could unfold: At the time of human landings on 
Mars, 1) Mars is still in a period of biological explora-
tion, and restrictions on Earth-sourced biological con-
tamination are still essential to scientific success; 2) 
Biological exploration of Mars has been completed 
without detecting life, and restrictions on biological 
contamination are no longer necessary for that purpose; 
and 3) (which can be paired with either of the other 
two) Restrictions on biological contamination are es-
sential to prevent damage to resources on Mars capable 
of supporting human colonists. 
The Concept of Special Regions: Special Regions 
on Mars are defmed as places (3D volumes) within 
which terrestrial microbial life could take a foothold, 
prosper, and reproduce. Because this would have the 
potential to confound the scientific exploration for in-
digenous life on Mars, a high priority requirement for 
spaceflight missions is to avoid such contamination, 
keeping the Special Regions safe (for additional de-
tails, see Rummel et al., 2014, and references therein). 
Locational Constraints on a Human Landing 
Site: We anticipate that a human landing site will need 
to have some degree of spatial separation from Special 
Regions in order to avoid deleterious contamination 
effects. Currently, however, we don't yet have a good 
way to establish the scale of that separation, taking into 
account wind, dust ·storms, and potential subsurface 
connectivity. Until this separation can be quantified for 
a particular landing site/Special Region combination, it 
is not known how close a source of contamination can 
be allowed to get to a previously identified Special 
Region. This issue has previously been recognized by 
MEPAG, and it is discussed in the MEPAG Goals 
Document (most recent version: MEP AG, 2014 ). 
Relationship to MEPAG Goal IV: In the MEPAG 
Goals Document, the importance of protecting Special 
Regions from human-sourced contamination is de-
scribed iri Investigation IV -2B. MEPAG points out that 
it is logically necessary to know, in advance of human 
missions, not only where the Special Regions are locat-
ed (including those formed by natural processes, but 
also those that could be induced by some element of 
the human mission), but also the pathways and proba-
bilities for the transport of contaminants to a nearby 
Special Region. Investigation IV -2B specifically calls 
for "understanding the rates and scales of the martian 
processes that would allow for the potential transport 
of viable terrestrial organisms to Special Regions." ". 
Once the Special Regions are located, we would need 
this to determine how close, and under what circum-
stances, human-related contamination could be al-
lowed. 
A practical question that needs discussion is what 
are the necessary informational inputs to determining 
the rates and scales of the various processes that would 
be relevant to the contamination of Special Regions? . 
This would need to include assessments of the form 
and probable quantities of the biological contaminants 
associated with human surface operations, such as that: 
• discharged into the air, 
• deliberately buried (either encapsulated or not), 
• adhering to the surface of equipment/spacesuits 
that are exposed to the martian environment 
• other. 
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We would then need to assess the· factors that relate to 
the mechanical dispersal of these biological contami-
nants, including speed, direction, and duration of the 
winds, adhesion coefficients of microbes/particles un-
der martian conditions, etc. 
Finally, we would need to understand the lethality of 
the martian environment to Earth-sourced microbes as 
a function of time and space. As the contaminant plume 
spreads, the live organisms would be affected by UV 
radiation, dessication, oxidation, lack of nutrients, etc., 
which would cause the live organisms to die (but not 
disappear- the dead remains would still be part of the 
contaminant plume). 
What do we need to measure or model to reach a 
community-acceptable solution to the above questions? 
At least some of these inputs can be obtained from ex-
periments and models here on Earth, but are there also 
data sets that would need to be collected from Mars? If 
so, this requires careful plarming through NASA's ro-
botic Mars Exploration Program. 
The inverse of Special Regions: If we presume 
that future exploration of Mars leads- at some point-
to relaxing the restrictions on biological contamination 
carried by spacecraft- in particular regarding the al-
lowable level of risk with respect to the contamination 
of at least parts of Mars-there may be in the future 
identifiable portions of Mars that are functionally the 
inverse of Special Regions. Instead of places where 
less than the current levels of spacecraft contamination 
(which have heretofore applied only to robotic mis-
sions) are allowed, there could be places on Mars 
where the additional contamination associated with 
human habitats and spacecraft would be allowed. Two 
key questions about implementing this potential future 
would be 1). What is the process whereby these places 
are identified and vetted, and 2). What is the timing 
wherein thi.s process takes place? 
Whatever the case, it is not within the planning 
horizon that we will remove all restrictions on biologi-
cal contamination on Mars. In fact, there are many re-
strictions in place (but less than fully adequate) on the 
transport ofbiological contamination on Earth (e.g., 4]. 
We can envision that Mars will have certain sites (such 
as Special Regions and other areas where Earth organ-
isms are not allowed) far into the future, and we can 
hope that the process and timing by which international 
PP policy would be revised relative to human missions 
will consider the situation carefully as the exploration 
of Mars continues. 
Conclusions: The above issues are significant input 
to planning for the specific location (or locations) to be 
considered for human exploration activities on the sur-
face of Mars. As of this writing, momentum seems to 
be increasing, in more than one sector here on Earth, 
for crewed missions to the Red Planet, both for explo-
ration and for long-term habitation. It would be pru-
dent to start now in discussing a process whereby the 
technical needs and timing associated with the biologi-
cal exploration of Mars, human exploration interests, 
and our internationally basedother international plane-
tary protection provisions can be simultaneously satis-
fied. 
References: [1] Rummel, J. D., Beaty, D. W., 
Jones, M. A., Bakermans, C., Barlow, N. G., Boston, 
P. J., ... & Wray, J. J. (2014). A New Analysis of Mars 
"Special Regions": Findings of the Second MEPAG 
Special Regions Science Analysis Group (SR-SAG2). 
Astrobiology, 14, 887-968. [2] MEPAG (2014), Mars 
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posted September, 2014 by the Mars Exploration 
Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) at 
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Planetapta.RI~IDlti~~ GIJ!pA>fGttaldurftana~.mat M.iQS!i(Dt(J&~h Center, Moffitt Field, CA; 1011.pdf 
March 2015 
ULTRAVIOLET IRRADIATION ON THE SURFACE OF MARS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EVA 
ACTIVffiES DURING FUTURE HUMAN MISSIONS. A. C . Schuerger, University of Florida, Space Life Sci-
ences Lab, Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899; email: schuerg@ufl.edu . 
Introduction: Robotic and piloted spacecraft are 
launched from Earth with finite levels of microbial 
contamination that are composed of species similar to 
the cleanroom environments within which the vehicles 
are assembled. After entering the harsh environment of 
interplanetary space, the microorganisms on the vented 
surfaces of spacecraft are subjected to biocidal factors 
that immediately begin to reduce the viable bioloads 
and species diversity of the launched vehicles. Based 
on published literature [see reviews by 1,2,3,4]. be-
tween 50-70% of spore-forming bacteria, and up to 2 
logs of non-spore forming species, may be inactivated 
during the 6-8 month cruise phase to Mars due to the 
solar UV irradiation (external surfaces), low pressure, 
and high desiccating conditions in interplanetary space. 
The harsh conditions found on the surface of Mars 
are only slightly more conducive to the survival of ter-
restrial microorganisms than are found in interplanetary 
space. Even the launched bioloads found within pres-
surized human habitats in Earth-Mars transit vehicles 
will be exposed to conditions that are likely to reduce 
the species diversity of microorganisms within the hu-
man life support systems [2]. The reductions in bio-
mass and species diversity of the launched bioloads on 
and within spacecraft are likely to simplify the forward 
contamination issues related to human expeditions on 
Mars by limiting the numbers of viable cells that might 
be dislodged from spacecraft surfaces and dispersed 
onto the martian terrain. 
The objectives of the current study are to character-
ize the UV flux on Mars, predict microbial survival 
under martian conditions, and model the likelihood of 
microbial contamination of the local terrain during 
future crewed missions. 
Methods: Experiments have been conducted under 
simulated martian conditions using a Mars Simulation 
Chamber (MSC) [described in 51 to determine the ef-
fects of solar UV irradiation, low pressure, gas compo-
sition, and low temperature on the survival of diverse 
Bacillus spp. The MSC system can accurately simulate 
five key components of the surface environment of 
Mars including: (a) pressures down to 0.1 mb, (b) 
UVC, UVB, and UVA irradiation from 190 to 400 nm, 
(c) dust loading in the atmosphere from optical depths 
of 0 .1 (low-dust sky) to 3.5 (global dust storm) using a 
series of neutral density filters, (d) temperatures from 
- 100 to 30 °C, and (e) atmospheric mixtures composed 
of the top five gases in the martian atmosphere [C02 
(95.53%), N2 (2.7%), Ar (1.6%), 0 2 (0.13%) and H20 
(0.03%). 
Results: The UV flux on equatorial Mars has been 
modeled by several teams [e.g ., 1 ,6,71 and yields ap-
proximate fluence rates for UV A ( 400-320 nm) , UVB 
(320-280 nm), and UVC (280-200 nm) of 38, 8, and 3 
W/m2 at the mean orbital distance from the sun. These 
fluence rates are then decreased or increased by ~ 18% 
at aphelion and perihelion, respectiveluy, during the 
martian orbit. The 7 mbar atmosphere of Mars fully 
attenuates the UV photons below 190 nm due to ab-
sorption by the C02 atmosphere [8]. Thus, strong 
biocidal UVC irradiation is present at the marian sur-
face . 
The martian UV flux was listed by Schuerger et al. 
[9] as the strongest of 17 biocidal factors on Mars that 
include: (1) solar UV irradiation, (2) extreme desicca-
tion, (3) low pressure (1-14 mbar), (4) anoxic C02 at-
mosphere, (5) extremely low temperatures (global av-
erage of -61 °C), (6) solar particle events, (7) galactic 
cosmic rays, (8) UV-glow discharges from blowing 
dust, (9) solar UV-induced volatile oxidants (e.g., 0 2- , 
o-, Hz01, NOx, 03), (10) globally distributed oxidizing 
soils, (11) extremely high salt levels (e.g., MgCb, 
NaCl, FeS04 , and MgS04) in surficial soils at some 
sites on Mars, (12) high concentrations of heavy metals 
in martian soils, (13) likely acidic conditions in martian 
regolith, (14) perchlorates in at least some soils, (15) 
lack of defined energy sources free of UV irradiation, 
(16) no known source of available nitrogen and carbon, 
and (17) no obvious redox couples for microbial me-
tabolism. These biocidal factors are consistent with 
other studies [10,11] that modeled conditions likely to 
be inhibitory to the growth of terrestrial life on Mars. 
Mars chamber results and modeling [ 1 ,12,13] sug-
gest that sun-exposed surfaces of spacecraft will be 
sterilized within a few tens-of-minutes to several hours 
on the first sol on Mars if the vehicles land under nor-
mal clear-sky conditions (optical depths < 0.5). Pres-
sure was found to have a minor effect, and gas compo-
sition and temperature were found to have no effect on 
spore survival under simulated martian conditions [1]. 
In one example (Fig. 1), the survivability between a 
UV-resistant bacterium (Bacillus pumilus SAFR-032) 
and a UV-sensitive bacterium (B . subtilis 42HS1) ex-
posed to a simulated Mars-normal equatorial UV flux 
indicated that most Bacillus spp . on sun-exposed sur-
faces are likely to be inactivated by greater than 6 or-
ders-of magnitude within 180 min on sol 1 after land-
ing [12]. Surface contaminants on the undersides of 
rovers and landers are also likely to be quickly inacti-
vated by solar UV due to reflected UV photons off of 
the surrounding terrain, but the process is approximate-
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ly 10-15 times slower due to the low (-3%) UV reflec-
tivity of the regolith [13]. Furthermore, UV penetra-
tion into surface defects on spacecraft materials has 
been modeled (Figs. 2 and 3) [14], and results suggest 
that even with embedded spores, UV photons (arrows 
in Figs. 2 and 3) will reach the microbial cells leading 
to the eventual accumulation of a lethal UV dose. The 
only conditions in which UV irradiation cannot act on 
the landed bioloads are conditions in which the 
microrbial cells are in fully contained internal compo-
nents of a rover (e.g., the computer CPU, internal pay-
loads), are covered by UV-attenuating materials, or in 
which multi-layered microbial aggregates form protec-
tive layers over embedded cells [ 14]. 
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Fig. 1. Both the UV-resistant B. pumilus SAFR-032 (top) and UV-
sensitive B. subtilis 42HS 1 (bottom) strains were inactivated within 
180 min under an equatorial Mars-normal UV flux (adapted from 
Schuerger eta!. [12]). 
Fig. 2. UV photons (arrows) can reach microbial cells (black ovals) 
embedded within pits, cracks, and defects on spacecraft materials 
(adapted from Schuerger eta!. [16]) 
Fig. 3. UV can be attneuated by multi-layers of cells or by UV 
absOrbing dusts, greases, etc. (adapted from Schuergeret a!. [16]). 
Discussion: Results suggest that a portion of the 
launched bioloads on spacecraft will be inactivated by 
the interplanetary environment before reaching Mars, a 
portion will be inactivated on sun-exposed surfaces of 
landed spacecraft within a few hours on sol 1, and sur-
vivors that are shielded from solar UV irradiation but 
exposed to the low pressure and low temperature of 
Mars may have significant difficulties growing under 
the environmental conditions found on the surface. 
However, Schuerger and colleagues [9, 14, 15] have 
demonstrated that at least seven genera of bacteria have 
members that can grow under martian conditions of 7 
mbar, 0 °C, and COrenriched anoxic atmospheres. 
Thus, we must remain cautious in concluding that the 
combination of 17 biocidal factors are alone capable of 
preventing the forward contamination of Mars. 
Knowledge Gaps. The following are examples of 
planetary protection knowledge gaps that could be ad-
dressed with future ground and ISS research. (1) Can 
spacecraft coatings be designed that will decrease the 
aggregation of multi-layered microbial colonies during 
prelaunch processessing, ·and thus, enhance the UV 
biocidal effects on Mars? (2) Can spacesuits be de-
signed that mitigate the adhesion of fine-grained 
surficaial fines in order to minimize the shielding ef-
fects of solar UV irradiation? (3) What is the differ-
ence between human spacesuit/habitat venting versus 
outgassing, and can viable cells be released by either 
processes? (4) How do microbial ecosystems change 
within human habitats over time, and can protocols be 
implemented that mititgate the survival of terrestrial 
microorganisms that might be released to the martian 
environment during EVAs? And (5), biocidal kill 
curves under martain conditions are required for a 
much wider diversity of terrestrial microorganisms than 
Bacillus spp. in order to accurately model the survival , 
growth, and adaption of the microbes on Mars? 
References: [1] Schuerger et al., (2003) Astrobiol-
ogy, 165, 253-276. [2] Schuerger, (2004), pp. 363-386, in: 
Martian Expedition Planing, ed., C. S. Cock.ell, Univelt 
Publishing. [3] Homeck et al., (1994) Adv. Space Res. 
14:41-45. [4] Dillion et al., (1973) Space Life Sci., 4, 180-
199. [5] Schuerger et al., (2008) Icarus, 194, 86-100). [6] 
Cockell et al., (2000) Icarus, 146, 343-359. [7] Patel et al., 
(2004) Adv. Space Res., 33, 1247-1252. [8] Kuhn and Atreya 
(1979) J. Mol. Evol., 14, 57-64. [9] Schuerger et al., (2013) 
Astrobiology 13, 115-131. [10] Beaty et al., (2006) Astrobi-
ology 6, 677-732. (II] Stoker et al., J. Geophysical Res . 115, 
doi: 10.102912009JE003421. [12] Schuerger et al ., (2006) 
Icarus 181, 52-62. [13] Moores et al., (2007) Icarus 192, 
417-433 . [14] Nicholson et al., (2013) PNAS 110, 666-671. 
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GEODERMATOPHILUS SP. STRAIN MN04-01 SURVIVES HIGH DOSES OF SIMULATED PRESENT-
DAY MARTIAN UV RADIATION. I. G. Paulino-Lima1, G. G. Araujo2, F. Rodrigues3, E. P. Silva4, L. J. Roth-
schild5 and D. Galante6• 1NPP FeiJow at NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, USA, 94035-0001, 
2Interunities Biotechnology Graduate Program, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, 05508-900, 3Institute of Chemistry, 
University of Siio Paulo, Brazil, 05508-000, 4Institute of Chemistry, University of Siio Paulo, Brazil, 05508-000, 
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Introduction: The ultraviolet radiation present 
during daytime on the surface of Mars is highly dam-
aging for most forms of life if unprotected and totally 
exposed [1]. Even Deinococcus radiodurans, a micro-
bial model for radiation-resistance studies, would be 
effectively inactivated if totally exposed to Martian 
UV [2], [3]. However, there might be other organisms 
yet to be discovered, that would not be inactivated so 
easily by Martian UV radiation if deposited in a clean 
surface such as a spacecraft. Geodermatophilus sp. 
strain MN04-0 1, was recently isolated from a manga-
nese deposit in the Sonoran Desert after a screening 
method developed for selecting highly UV -resistant 
microorganisms. This isolate is 3 times more resistant 
to UV-C radiation than D. radiodurans, as measured 
through colony counts on agar plates. Here we report 
its survival to a simulated Martian UV irradiation ex-
periment performed at NAP-Astrobio, University of 
Siio Paulo, Brazil. 
Material and Methods: 
Microbial cultures: Cells of Geodermatophilus sp. 
strain MN04-01 were grown in GOM Medium (1 .5% 
Malt Extract, 1% starch, I% sucrose, 0.5% yeast ex-
tract , 0.2% CaC03) for 7 days at 30 °C, 200 rpm. 
Cells of Deinococcus radiodurans were grown in TGY 
medium (I% tryptone, 0.6% yeast extract, 0.2% glu-
cose) for 15h at 30 °C, 200 rpm. 0.5 rnl aliquots of 
each organism were centrifuged at 8,000 rpm for 3 min 
and the cell pellet was washed twice through centrifu-
gation in the same conditions using saline solution 
(0.9% NaCl). Finally, the cells were resuspended in 0.5 
ml of saline solution. 
Sample loading: Four replicates of 2 !J.l aliquots of 
the cell suspension were loaded in four 5 mm x 5 mm 
silicon support (Si 111 ). After 10 min of dehydration 
in a laminar flow hood at room temperature the silicon 
supports were flxed on a metallic mount using a carbon 
tape. The mount containing the samples was then ftxed 
inside the Mars Simulation Chamber. 
Experimental conditions: The Martian uv flux was 
simulated using a non-ozone free Oriel Solar Simulator 
containing a xenon-arc lamp emmiting a broad spec-
trum of UV, visible and infrared radiation. To mini-
mize the amount of infrared radiation delivered, an air 
mass 0 (AMO) ftlter was used to correct the lamp spec-
trum and a water filter was placed between the solar 
simulator and the vacuum chamber (Fig. 1). The uv 
flux was measured usin a Vilber Lourrnat radiometer 
as 87 W/m2 for UV-A, 118 W/m2 for UV-B and 23 
W 1m2 for UV -C. 
The samples were irradiated at room temperature 
under an atmosphere of 8 mbar containing 95% C02 
and 5% N2, to the following Martian full uv doses, in 
kJ/m2: 3, 6, 10, 30,60 and 100. 
Analytical techniques: After the irradiation, indi-
vidual silicon supports containing the samples were 
placed in rnicrofuge tubes containing 1 00 !J.} of appro-
priate culture media and vortexed for at least 20 se~ 
conds. Cell suspensions were serial diluted I o·1 to 1 o"" 
and 10 !J.l aliquots were inoculated on agar plates, 
which were incubated at 30 oc for up to 10 days. Col-
onies of irradiated samples (N) and the non-irradiated 
control (N0) were counted and the results (N/N0) were 
plotted in a graph showinF survival curves. The re-
maining volumes of the 1 o· dilutions were also stained 
with propidium iodide and SYTOX® green for 
live/dead quantification through fluorescence micro-
scopic analysis. 
Fig. 1. Experimental setup showing: solar simulator 
(S), water ftlter (W), AMO filter (F), radiometer (R), 
vaccum chamber (V), and biological specimens being 
irradiated (B). 
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Results: 
Colony counts: LD10 (dose that kills 90% of the 
population) was 3.27 ± 0.25 kJ/m2 for D. radiodurans 
and > 100 kJ/m2 (maximum dose tested in our experi-
ments) for Geodermatophilus sp. strain MN04-01 (Fig. 
2). 
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Fig. 2. Survival of Geodermatophilus sp. strain MN04-
0 1 to full uv (200-400 nm) under martian atmosphere, 
and comparison with D. radiodurans. Fluorescence 
microscopy data is also shown on the graph. CFU, 
colony forming-units. PI, propidium iodide. SG, 
SYTOX® green. 
Fluorescence: After analyzing 13 micrographs for 
the non-irradiated control and 14 for samples irradiated 
with 60 kJ/m2 of Martian UV irradiation (Fig. 3), both 
staining methods resulted in similar numbers (Fig. 4). 
A 
Fig. 3. A, Phase contrast micrograph showing cells of 
Geodermatophilus sp. strain MN04-0l. B, Fluores-
cence micrograph (SYTOX® green) showing dead 
cells of the same organism after 60 kJ/m2 of Martian 
full uv irradiation. 
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l.OOf-02 
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Samples 
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1-Pil ~ 
Fig. 4. Viability of strain MN04-tH to 60 kJ/m2 of 
Martian full uv irradiation as determined by fluores-
cence microscopy using propidium iodide (PI) and 
SYTOX® green (SG). 
Raman spectroscopy of colonies (Fig. 5) indicates 
the production of a melanin-like pigment that strongly 
absorbs UV-C radiation. 
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Fig. 5. Raman spectrum showing two shifts, at 1313 
cm·1 and 1595 cm·1, consistent with melanin. 
Conclusions: The results obtained in this research 
have implications for planetary protection and space 
exploration using biological systems. This microbial 
isolate represents an excellent biological model for 
photobiology studies including DNA damage and re-
pair analysis. 
References: [1] Homeck G. et al . (2010) Microbial Mol 
Bioi Rev, 74(1) 121-156. [2] Paulino-Lima I. G. et al . (2010) 
Planet Space Sci, 58(10), 1180-1187. [3] Abrevaya X. C. et 
al. (2011) Astrobiology 11(10) 1034-1040. 
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PREDICTING THE RESPONSE OF TERRESTRIAL CONTAMINATION ON MARS WTH BALLOON 
EXPERIMENTS IN EARTH'S STRATOSPHERE. D. J. Smith1 and E-MIST Team2, 1NASA Ames Research 
Center, Mail Code: SCR, Space Biosciences Research Branch, david.Lsmith-3@nasa.gov 2NASA Kennedy Space 
Center, Engineering and Technology Directorate 
Introduction: We designed, built and flew a self-
contained payload, Exposing Microorganisms in the 
Stratosphere (E-MIST), on a large scientific balloon 
launched from New Mexico on 24 Aug 2014 (1]. The 
payload carried Bacillus pumilus SAFR-032, a highly-
resilient spore-forming bacterial strain originally iso-
lated from a NASA spacecraft assembly facility. Our 
balloon test flight evaluated microbiological proce-
dures and overall performance of the novel payload. 
Measuring the endurance of spacecraft-associated mi-
crobes. at extreme altitudes may help predict their re-
sponse on the surface of Mars since the upper atmos-
phere also exerts a harsh combination of stresses on 
microbes (e.g., lower pressure, higher irradiation, des-
iccation and oxidation) [2]. 
Materials and Methods: Our payload (83.3 em x 
53.3 em x 25.4 em; mass 36 kg) mounted onto the ex-
terior of a high altitude balloon gondola. Four inde-
pendent "skewers" rotated 180° to expose samples to 
the stratosphere. During ascent or descent, the samples 
remained enclosed within dark cylinders at - 25 °C. 
Each skewer had a base plate holding ten separate alu-
minum coupons with Bacillus pumilus spores deposited 
on the surface. Before and after the flight, B. pumilus 
was sporulated, enumerated and harvested using previ-
ously described techniques [3- 5]. 
Major payload components were a lithium-ion bat-
tery, an ultraviolet (UV) radiometer (400 to 230 om), 
humidity and temperatures sensors, and a flight com-
puter. During the test flight, samples remained in a · 
sealed position until the payload reached the lower 
stratosphere (- 20 km above sea level). Next, the flight 
computer rotated the skewers into the outside air. After 
a short rotation demonstration (2 seconds), all skewers 
reverted to the closed position for the remainder of the 
flight. The payload continued floating at an altitude of 
37.6 km for 4 hours before beginning a 23 minute de-
scent on parachute. 
Results and Discussion: Our first test flight exam-
ined unknowns associated with sample transportation, 
gondola installation, balloon ascent/descent, and time 
lingering in the New Mexico desert awaiting payload 
launch and recovery. We created a batch of experi-
mental control coupons (each containing approximately 
l x 1 06 spores) used throughout the investigation for 
ground and flight test purposes. Several treatment cate-
gories were evaluated: Lab Ground Coupons (kept in 
the KSC laboratory); Transported Ground Coupons 
(traveled to New Mexico and back but not installed in 
payload); and Flight Coupons (flown). A subset of 
coupons from each treatment category were processed, 
resulting in statistically equivalent viability (K:ruskal-
Wallis rank-sum test at a 95% confidence level). Taken 
together, nearly identical viability from all coupons 
indicate that balloon flight operations and payload pro-
cedures did not influence spore survival. A negative 
control (blank, sterile coupon) was also flown to verify 
payload seals prevented outside contamination. 
A species-specific inactivation model that predicts 
the persistence of microbes on the surface of Mars is 
one of many possible outcomes from balloon experi-
ments in the stratosphere. The simplicity of the payload 
design lends itself to customization. Future investiga-
tors can easily reconfigure the sample base plate to 
accommodate other categories of microorganisms or 
molecules relevant to the Planetary Protection commu-
nity. If future flights exposed microbes for hours, we 
would expect to see a rapid inactivation. Smith et al. 
[6] simulated stratospheric conditions and measured a 
99.9% loss of viable Bacillus subtilis spores after only 
6 hours of direct UV irradiation. Earth's stratosphere is 
extremely dry, cold, irradiated, and hypobaric, and it 
may be useful for microorganisms isolated from NASA 
spacecraft assembly facilities to be evaluated in this 
accessible and robust Mars analog environment. 
References: [1] D. J. Smith et al. (2014) Gravita-
tional and Space Research, 2, 70-80. [2] D. J. Smith 
(2013) Astrobiology, 13, 981- 990. [3] P. A. 
Vaishampayan et al. (2012) Astrobiology, 12, 487-
497. [ 4] R. L. Mancinelli and M . Klovstad (2000) 
Planetary and Space Science, 48, 1093- 1097. [5] R. 
Moeller et al. (2012) Astrobiology, 12, 457-468. [6] D. 
J. Smith et al. (2011) Aerobiologia, 27, 319- 332. 
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LOW DISPERSAL OF HUMAN-ASSOCIATED MICROBES ON TO PRISTINE SNOW DURING AN 
ARCTIC TRAVERSE ON SEA ICE BY THE MOON-I PLANETARY SURFACE ROVER. A. C. Schuerger1 
and P. Lee2•3 .4, 1University of Florida, Space Life Sciences Lab, Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899; email: 
schuerg@ufl.edu; 2Mars Institute, 3SETI Institute, 4NASA Ames Research Center, MS 245-3, Moffett field, CA 
94035; email: pascal.lee@marsinstitute.net. 
Introduction: Future human missions to Mars will 
transport terrestrial microorganisms to the sites of ex-
ploration. This . will be an unintended experiment in 
directed panspermia [ 1]. In April 2009, a modified 
Humvee vehicle called the Moon-] rover (Fig. 1, back-
ground) conducted a 496 km traverse over sea ice 
along the Northwest Passage from Kugluktuk .to Cam-
bridge Bay, Nunavut, Canada. This Northwest Pas-
sage Drive Expedition was carried out under the auspi-
ces of the NASA Haughton-Mars Project in support of 
field studies of pressurized rovers in future Moon/Mars 
human exploration. During the traverse, team mem-
bers collected samples from within the Moon-1 rover, 
and from pristine snow-covered surfaces around the 
rover at three overnight locations (Fig. 1, foreground) . 
The objective was to determine the extent of microbial 
dispersal away from the Moon-] rover and on to pris-
tine snow during EVA activities. 
Methods: The Moon-1 rover is a non-pressurized 
all-terrain rover simulating some of the basic attributes 
of a pressurized planetary rover, including the ability to 
traverse unprepared terrain and offer shelter to a crew 
of five. The diesel-powered Moon- I was accompanied 
by two gasoline-powered snowmobiles, with each 
snowmobile pulling a komatik sled loaded with food, 
fuel, and other equipment and supplies. 
Samples of surface snow were collected in sterile 
50 cc plastic tubes at three sites along the traverse: 
Sites A, B, and C. At each of these sites, six tubes of 
samples were collected systematically in specific loca-
tions in relation to the Humvee (Fig. 2): 1 = inside, on 
driver side floor; 2 = inside, in drainage gutter on rear 
access steps; 3 = outside, upwind; 4 = outside, down-
wind; 5 = outside, up-track; 6 = outside, down-track. 
Site A was a brief science stop during day 1 of the 7-
day traverse. Sites B and C were overnight stops with 
samples collected in the morning. Food was prepared 
and consumed outside the Humvee within 3 m of the 
rear of the vehicle at Sites B and C. 
Microbial characterization. Snow and ice samples 
were kept frozen (-25 to -5 °C; HOBO data logger) 
during the traverse, and then shipped on-ice to micro-
biological labs at Kennedy Space Center, FL for pro-
cessing (Schuerger lab). After melting snow samples at 
4 °C for 48 ·hrs, aliquots of all samples were plated on 
R2A agar plates at undiluted rates. Samples were in-
cubated at 37, 24, or 4 °C, and the numbers of colony-
forming units (cfu's) per sample and temperature were 
estimated after 7 and 28 days of incubation. Unique 
colonial morphotypes were recovered and purified 
from all petri plates; over 200 individual isolates of 
bacteria and fungi were collected and archived. 
Fig. 1: Microbial sampling of pristine snow in the 
vicinity of the Moon-] Humvee Rover (back-
ground). 
Fig. 2: Moon-I sampling pattern for human associ-
ated microorganisms. 
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Table 1: Moon-I traverse summary data. 
Recovered isolates of culturable bacteria and fungi 
were processed with established 16S and 18S sequenc-
ing protocols [2,3,4,5]. 16S and 18S sequences were 
then generated by the Interdisciplinary Center for Bio-
technology Research (ICBR) at the University of Flori-
da. All sequences were subsequently identified using 
the BLAST library on the NCB! website 
(http:/ /blast.ncbi .nlm.nih. gov/Blast.cgi). 
Results: All samples collected from within the 
Moon-] rover were heavily populated by culturable 
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bacterial and fungal species. Bacterial populations in 
samples collected within the Moon-] rover ranged be-
tween 1.25 x 102 and 2.7 x 103 cfu/mL for samples 
incubated at 37 °C, and from 10 to 1.1 x 103 cfulml for 
cultures incubated at 24 and 4 °C. Fungal populations 
from inside the rover ranged between 2-3 cfulmL and 
2.5 x 102 cfulmL. All snow samples from the upwind, 
downwind, up-track, and down-track sample sites exte-
rior to the Moon-I rover were negative for both bacte-
ria and fungi except for two cfu's recovered at Site A 
from sample A4 (downwind; bacterium) and A5 
(uptrack; fungus) . The bacterial isolate was identified 
as Brevibacillus agri (accession JX517278; closest 
match 0.998), and the fungal isolate was identified as 
Aspergillus fumigatus (accession JX517279; closest 
match 0.991). Both microbes were also recovered 
from within the Moon-] rover. Thus, while the internal 
samples from the Moon-I rover contained a wide range 
of colony morphotypes of culturable bacteria and fun-
gi, only two individual colonies (1 bacterial and 1 fun-
gal) were recovered from all of the snow samples col-
lected exterior to the rover. 
Fig. 3: Top row:Microbial diversity typically observed 
for samples collected from within the Moon-1 rover. 
Bottom row: Most snow samples from outside the rov-
er were negative for culturable bacteria and fungi . 
The dominant fungi recovered from within the 
Moon-1 rover include species from the genera 
Alternaria, Aspergillus, Cladosporium, Geomyces, 
Phoma, Penicillium, and Tetracladium. The dominant 
bacterial species recovered from within the Moon-] 
rover were Bacillus circulans, B.licheniformis, B . 
megaterium, B.psychrodurans, B. subtilis, B. simplex, 
Brevibacillus borstelensis, Kocuria rosea, 
Microbacterium paraoxydans, Paenibacillus pabuli, P. 
illinosensis, P . amlolyticus, and Sporosarcina 
aquimarina. 
Discussion: The results support the conclusion that 
human-associated microorganisms were not easily dis-
persed on to the. snowy terrains during the Moon-1 
traverse. The sampling was designed to investigate 
contamination of pristine snow aound the Moon-] ve-
hicle as a possible prediction of airborne microbial 
dispersal away from a crewed rover and EVA activities 
by humans during a future crewed Mars mission. The 
recovery of only one bacterium and one fungus on 
hundreds of R2A petri plates from 11 snow samples is 
also consistent with the emplacement of the microbes 
in to the samples during the collection process in the 
field or lab contaminantion during processing. Current 
data did not permit the elimination of these latter two 
possibilities. But clearly, snow contamination of the 
snow sample sites along the 496 km traverse of the 
Moon-I rover did not occur at a high rate of exchange 
between the crewed rover and the local terrain. 
The implications for a human mission to Mars is 
that even if crew members are involved in collecting 
field samples, as long as they are using sterilized im-
plements when interacting with the terrain, they are 
likely not to contaminate sample sites. Furthermore, 
two additional factors present on Mars, but lacking in 
the Arctic, are likely to reduce the chances of contami-
nating regolith or rock samples during human missions: 
(1) all humans will be fully contained within sealed 
spacesuits which will greatly isolate their indigenous 
microflora during EVA activities, and (2) the surface 
of Mars has at least 17 biocidal factors (6] that will 
increase the inactivation of human-associated microbes 
on the outside surfaces of spacesuits, equipment, and 
rovers; thus reducing viable external bioloads during 
human missions on Mars. It is likely that the biocidal 
stresses on Mars will be several orders of magnitude 
harsher than were encountered during the Moon- I mis-
sion, and thus, potential microbial dispersal is likely to 
be reduced proportionally from that described herein. 
References: [1] Mckay and Stoker (1989) Rev. 
Geophysics, 27, 189-214. [2] Lueders et al. (2004) 
Environ. Microbial. 6, 73-78. (31 Diez et al. (2001) 
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Introduction: 
On the 11th of January 2015 myself (Samuel Mark Harri-
son) a Bournemouth University Student and Daniel Parker 
both from the UK launched our Shackleton 2 near Space 
Probe (pictured). This was part of project to test ultra low-
cost near-space vehicles that can be used to carry out near-
space research. Our probe travelled over 300 miles (flight 
path pictured) and endured the hostile environment of near 
space. It experienced temperatures as low as -50 degrees 
Celsius, a near vacuum at its peak attitude of 89,000ft and 
speeds of over lSOmph. Our probe was carried to this alti-
tude using a 2000g PAWAN Indian weather balloon filled 
with helium. 
By using these near space probes research can be carried 
out into planetary protection by launching biological samples 
into the extreme conditions that space offers. This allows us 
to see which types of sample biological contamination thrive 
even in near space. This represents a small but vital step to 
ensuring we don't contaminate future planets particularly in 
the context of manned missions when the risk of biological 
contamination is far greater. Due to the levels of altitude 
which weather balloons can operate at (up to 130,000ft) re-
search can also be carried out into the effects of cosmic radi-
ation on cells. This would be of great relevance both in the 
context of contamination but also on the ability for humans 
to survive outside of earth's environment 
Basic probes complete with tracking system can be 
launched and recovered for a fraction of the cost of 
other alternatives which allows this area of research to 
be far more accessible for students on a global level. 
Given the rise of nations such as India and China and 
their respective space programs this technology is a 
fantastic low-cost tool for building the skills of future 
bright minds around the world for the manned mis-
sions of the future. 
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